Water Demand in the Chicago Metropolitan Area by Mieno, Taro
WATER DEMAND IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA
BY
TARO MIENO
B.S., Hokkaido University, 2007
THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in Agricultural and Consumer Economics
in the Graduate College of the





Illinois faces a legally defined quota for the amount of water that it is allowed to
pump from Lake Michigan. Separately, in Northeastern Illinois, the ground water
level has fallen due to pumping pressure. Together, these constraints on water
supply could limit economic and population growth in the Chicago Metropolitan
area. There are two alternatives to meet the area’s growing demand: pumping
water from distant sources, or using the available water more efficiently. The former
will require huge investments in infrastructure, while the latter could postpone or
circumvent those investments. In light of these facts, curbing water demand, rather
than expanding water supply, seems like a promising option. The objective of study
is to understand water demand in the Chicago area by examining the effects of
water price, weather conditions, and socio-demographic characteristics on water use
in Chicago Metropolitan Area. Economic theory tells us that water demand should
be responsive to water price. For policy makers, consumer responsiveness to water
price changes will be invaluable information when considering long term strategies
to ensure the efficient and conservative use of Chicago’s water resource.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
Northeastern Illinois borders Lake Michigan, one of the largest bodies of water in
the U.S, and has large ground water aquifers. Water shortages have consequently
rarely been a problem in the region. Other parts of the state are not as fortunate:
Springfield, the capital city of Illinois, experienced a long and costly drought in
2005. In addition, a report entitled “Troubled Water: Meeting Future Water Needs
in Illinois” predicts that, in the near future, some areas are likely to face water
shortages because of expected increases in water demand due to population and
economic growth. On January 2006, Governor Blagojevich issued Executive order
2006-01 1 that called for state-wide water supply planning. The Chicago
Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP) was commissioned by the State of
Illinois Department of Natural Resources to facilitate this planning process in
Northeastern Illinois. CMAP created a Regional Water Supply Planning Group
(RWSPG) to lead this process and prepare a water resource management plan.
In the course of the RWSPG’s work, Dziegielewski and Chowdhury (2008)
forecasted that water use in the region could grow by up to 64% by 2050. However,
on the supply side, the amount of water available to Illinois is physically and legally
limited. After the reversal of the Chicago River in 1900, followed by a series of law
suits, the U.S. Supreme Court decreed that Illinois is allowed to draw no more than
3,200 cubic feet per second (approximately 24, 000 gallons per second) of water from
Lake Michigan. Starting from 1864, when the first well was drilled in Chicago,
groundwater has been heavily pumped in the Northeastern Illinois region, peaking
1http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=3&RecNum=4579
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at 182.9 million gallons per day (mgd) in 1979 (Visocky 1997). Consequently,
considerable decreases in the aquifer water levels were observed. After 1980, when
large portions of DuPage and Lake Counties shifted from groundwater to Lake
Michigan water, the aquifer water levels started to rise slowly. The report by
Dziegielewski, however, predicted that demand for groundwater could grow up to
about 400 mgd per day by 2050 from about 150 mgd at present. Realization of this
prediction would again cause groundwater extraction at unsustainable rates.
Moreover, because of uncertainties in future climatic conditions at the regional scale
caused by ongoing and accelerating global warming, the future physical water
availability is at best uncertain. Water shortages will be likely events in the Chicago
Metropolitan area if no measures to conserve water are taken.
Traditionally, across the U.S., the solution to meet growing water demand has long
been to increase water supply. However, supply enhancement, which involves
enlarging water treatment facilities, expanding water pipes, drilling wells or creating
dams, is expensive. Moreover, since the easily accessible water sources have already
been developed, remaining water sources will require increasingly expensive
infrastructure. Growing concern about the environment2 also makes an increase in
water supply less appealing because less water is left for ecological purposes. These
costs associated with water supply enhancement have led water managers to
consider water demand management. Water demand management is a more
cost-effective way to accommodate water demand in the sense that it could delay or
even avoid future expensive investments in water supply enhancement. Aware of
these benefits of water demand management, RWSPG also considers it an
important strategy to manage increasing future water demand in the Chicago area.
In order for water managers to implement residential water demand management, it
is essential to know what factors affect residential water demand. Many water
2It is worth noting that RWSPG’s principal objective is to provide adequate amount of water at affordable cost
to support not only resident’s quality of life and economic growth but also the natural ecosystem in Northeastern
Illinois.
2
demand studies have been done so far. The geographical focus of existent studies,
however, has been largely on the arid Southwest, where people have long suffered
from frequent and long-lasting water shortages (Espey et al., 1997). Water use
habits in Illinois, which is blessed with relatively abundant water, might be
significantly different from ones in those arid areas. A 2003 meta-analyis done by
Dalhuisen et al. show that people are more responsive to changes in the water price
in western areas than in eastern areas. This implies that when it comes to applying
the estimation results to actual policy making, site-specific study is the most
valuable. To this author’s knowledge, however, only two studies have analyzed
residential water consumption in Illinois (Wong, 1972; Dziegielewski and
Chowdhury, 2008). Wong points out that the consumption data used in his study is
unreliable because at that time, many systems had no metering. Moreover, the data
are now rather dated and might not reflect current water use trends. Dziegielewski
and Chowdhury studied public water (as defined by EPA) use based on annual
water consumption of 37 study sites in northeastern illinois. By its definition, public
water could include residential, industrial, and commercial water uses. Therefore,
applicability of the estimated water demand function for water demand
management in the residential sector alone is limited. Therefore, a contemporary
study of residential water demand in the Chicago metropolitan area, may assist the
RWSPG as it considers demand management possibilities for the future.
Water demand is likely to be affected by many factors including price, demographic,
characteristics of households, existing economic policies, climate conditions, water
using technologies, and plumbing codes. Among these factors, we give special
attention to the effect of water price for two main reasons. First, it is one of the few
factors over which water managers have direct control. Second, water pricing is a
cost-effective way to influence water use. Economists classify policies on the use of a
particular good into two groups: price-based and regulatory approaches. In the area
of water conservation, water managers have historically emphasized prescriptive
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regulations to achieve water conservation (Olmstead and Stavins, 2008). For
example, when faced with state-wide drought through the mid-1980’s and early
1990’s, California carried out various kinds of nonprice programs. For example, from
1980 to 1995, Los Angeles implemented public education, encouraged local
government to require the adoption of water-efficient appliances, and applied direct
water use restrictions on certain types of use3(Michelson et al., 1998). However,
price-based approaches, in principle, have the advantage of cost-effectiveness (Pigou,
1920; Baumol and Oates, 1988). This advantage arises from heterogeneity in the
marginal value of water use. For example, uniform water use restrictions inevitably
make the marginal willingness to pay for water vary across households with different
numbers of occupants, incomes, and preferences, thus creating dead-weight loss.
Empirical studies that look at welfare implications of price-based and non-price
based approaches for water demand reduction support the conclusion that
price-based policies increase economic welfares (Brennan et al., 2007; Olmstead and
Stavins, 2008).
Recognizing the potential of water pricing as a way of promoting efficient water
conservation, RWSPG is also considering water pricing as a mean to promote
efficiency and conservation in Northeastern Illinois. When it comes to implementing
water pricing, it is essential to know how much water reduction could be achieved
through changes in price. This information is summarized in the price elasticity of
water demand-the percentage change in demand caused by a one percent price
increase.
As of 2003, more than 64 studies on water demand had been published and over 300
estimates of price elasticity produced (Dalhuisen et al., 2003). A methodological
focus of the existing water demand literature has been on the econometric
difficulties caused by block rate pricing, which is commonly used in U.S4. In block
3Renwick and Green (2000) address the effect of non-market based water conservation strategies carried out in
California on water reduction
4Having faced with chronic water scarcity, increasing number of water utilities have come to apply increasing block
rates for conservation purpose (Hanemann, 1997). In fact, in 2002, one-third of residents were faced with increasing
4
rate structures, the marginal charge changes according to the amount of
consumption. Because the water price depends on the amount of water
consumption, the two are spuriously correlated in an econometric estimation. This
could bias the coefficient estimate on water price unless measures are taken to deal
with the problem. For example, in the case of increasing block rates, water price
and water consumption are positively correlated, thus leading to underestimation of
how responsive people are to price increases. Detailed discussion on this issue is to
be reviewed later in the methodology section.
However, beyond this important methodological concern, few studies investigate
how other factor such as socio-economic and climate factors affect the price
elasticity of water demand. That information is potentially useful to water
managers when implementing water pricing. For example, Carver and Boland
(1980), Howe (1982), Griffin and Chang (1990), and Lyman (1992) show that the
price elasticity of water demand is higher in summer than in winter. In summer,
discretionary uses, like watering lawns, washing cars and filling swimming pools,
comprise a larger portion of total water use than in winter, when water use is
basically limited to inelastic indoor sanitary uses. This implies the possibility of
seasonal water pricing, where the water rate is set higher in summer.
Despite its theoretical cost-effectiveness advantage over quantity restrictions on
water use, water pricing is by no means a panacea. There are many aspects other
than cost-effectiveness that water managers need to contemplate when
implementing water-pricing policies. Equity is one of the important dimensions of
water demand management. Water is widely held to be a basic necessity that
should be available to all at reasonable cost (Mansur and Olmstead, 2007). Agthe
and Billings (1987) and Mansur and Olmstead (2007) empirically show higher water
price elasticity for lower-income households and argue that an equity problem arises
block rates (Olmstead et al., 2007). Also in Illinois, block rate pricing is common form of water pricing. Dziegielewski
et al. (2004) directed a mail survey to 1724 water systems in Illinois and found out that out of 426 responding systems,
148 were using block rate pricing. However, only 16 were using increasing block rate and 132 were still using decreasing
block rate. Therefore, instead of increasing block rate pricing, decreasing block rate is still dominant in Illinois.
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because lower income households contribute a larger portion of total water
reduction. Therefore, exploring what and how other factors affect water price
elasticity could generate useful information for water managers who are considering
water pricing as a measure to achieve water conservation.
Water use patterns in summer are particularly important. Water infrastructure is
built so that it can meet the peak summertime water demand. This makes water
use reduction in summer especially valuable because it would avoid or delay future
costly investments in water infrastructure, the biggest contributor to the production
costs of water. Therefore, insight into water use during summer is especially
valuable. We specifically examine the effect of income on water demand and whether
temperature and rainfall affect water demand differently in summer and winter.
The contributions of this study to water demand literature are two. First, this
study provides the first contemporary residential water demand analysis focused
particularly on Illinois. Second, it explores a rather undeveloped field in the water
demand literature: specifically, what affects water price elasticity and summertime
water use.
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2. Specifying Water Demand
In most water demand studies, a general water demand function can be framed
as Qw = f(P,X), where Qw, P , and X, represent water consumption, price, and
other variables, respectively. The variables selection and functional form vary
greatly from study to study. In this section, drawing on the water demand
literature, the study develops a water demand model within this framework.
Dependent variable: water consumption
In the literature on water demand, specification of the water consumption unit
has taken various forms, including per person, per household, and per community.
By far the most common unit is water consumption per household. This is the basic
unit of water use measurement in most communities. The level of aggregation of
water consumption further differentiates how Qw is defined. When household-level
consumption data are not available and only aggregate data are available, which is
the typical case for water demand studies, the average water consumption of the
typical household in a community is often used. In theory, actual household level
water consumption data is preferred over an aggregate proxy because it reveals the
full variability of actual use and the true heterogeneity of the uses. That variability
supports more precise and reliable results. However, because the data collection
process often involves confidentiality issues, it is extremely hard to obtain household
level data. Even if one succeeded to obtain household level consumption data, other
household variables, especially income data, are difficult and costly to obtain. This
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is the main reason for the dearth of water demand analyses at the household level.
Some studies that managed to do this are Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989), Hewitt
and Hanemann (1995), Arbue´s and Villanu´a (2006), and Olmstead et al. (2007).
The list is very short compared to large number of studies that use aggregate water
consumption and demographic data. For these same reasons of data access, this
study proceeds with aggregate data.
The time-frame of water quantity demand also differs between studies, ranging from
daily to annual. While annual water consumption does not allow for taking into
account the seasonality of water consumption, daily water consumption is rarely
recorded. The time frame used in this study is monthly. Monthly data are
commonly used for billing purposes and are therefore readily available. Monthly
data also capture seasonal changes in water consumption. The use of monthly




Water tariffs normally consist of two parts. One is a monthly fixed charge that
each customer pays irrespective of the amount of water consumption, and the other
is a non-fixed charge that depends on the amount of water consumption. The fixed
charge is intended to cover the costs of infrastructure that do not vary with water
use. A fixed charge reduces water demand through income effects. Since water is a
normal good, an increase in the marginal price of water gives consumers an
incentive to consume less water.
The marginal price of water in the model is defined as the combination of the water
price and sewer price. Sewer charges are almost always proportionate to water
consumption. Increases in sewer and water prices often occur at the same time.
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Therefore, excluding the sewer price might result in overestimation of the absolute
value of the price elasticity of water demand.
Aggregate residential water consumption data includes the amount used in rental as
well as self-owned properties. While owner-occupied units can safely be assumed to
bear the full cost of water prices, this is not necessarily the case for rentals. Water
costs may be lumped into the basic rental charge. In such cases, residents do not
directly face water prices and those prices provide no incentive to conserve water.
Thus the inability to separate out water consumption by households whose water
bills are fixed could result in negative bias in the absolute magnitude of water price
elasticity.
Income
In addition to price, another potential driver of water demand is income.
Higher-income households are more likely to have water intensive characteristics,
such as larger lawns and gardens, and swimming pools. Therefore, larger income is
expected to be positively correlated with water demand.
Income has an interesting relatoinship to water price elasticity. If income increases
in greater proportion than water use, water charges will represent a decreasing share
of income and become a lesser concern for consumers. At the same time, for
wealthier households, larger share of the water use is highly discretionary and,
potentially, responsive to price changes. Therefore, there exist two opposite effect of
income on water price elasticity. Income could potentially either positively or
negatively affect water price elasticity depending on the relative magnitudes of the
two effects. Empirically, the income level has been shown to lead to lesser
responsiveness to water price. Renwick and Archibald (1998) divide their sample
into 4 different income classes and estimate price elasticities for each class. They
find that the price elasticity of water demand is higher for low income households
than middle and high income households. Agthe and Billings (1987) and Mansur
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and Olmstead (2007) also empirically show higher water price elasticity for
lower-income households. They argue that the income level affects the effectiveness
of water reduction achieved by increasing water price and that an increase in price
causes lower-income households to contribute a disproportionately share of total
water reduction. This could be a significant concern for water managers since an
increase in water price inevitably raises political tension for communities. Further
research on how income level influences water price elasticity is therefore useful.
Home features
Ownership of swimming pools and lot sizes have both proven to explain water
demand variation (e.g, Howe and Linaweaver (1967), Nieswiadomy and Molina
(1989), Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), and Dandy et al. (1997)). Unfortunately
data regarding these variables are not available for Chicago-area water systems.
Inclusion of an income variable will indirectly reflect at least some of the effects of
these variables on water demand because income is considered to be highly
correlated with these variables (Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995; Dandy et al., 1997).
Household size and characteristics
The number of people in a household also seems likely to affect water demand.
Brennan et al. (2007) showed larger families consume more water, but with
diminishing water consumption per additional family member because of economies
of scale, for example, in dish washing and lawn watering. However, the effect of
household size on water demand is rather ambiguous in this study. A larger
household does not necessarily mean a larger amount of water consumption. For
example, a married couple living in a large house with large garden and a swimming
pool would consume more water than three college students living in a small house
with no garden. Therefore, correction for these attributes of a housing unit would
be required to isolate the pure effect of household size on water demand. However,
10
as mentioned above, no data were available for those variables.
Climate and seasonality of water use
In a temperate climate, water consumption exhibits strong seasonality. In some
municipalities, water consumption in summer is two or more times as high as that
in other seasons (see Appendix E). Water consumption can be decomposed into two
parts: non-discretionary and discretionary. Non-discretionary water use covers basic
and indispensable needs such as drinking, cooking, toilet flushing, bathing, and
laundering. Water use for these purposes is needed to maintain a minimum quality
of life and occurs mostly indoors. For these reasons, non-discretionary water use is
considered to be relatively invariant across the year and insensitive to climate and
price. Discretionary water use is for washing cars, filling swimming pools, and
watering lawns and gardens. Discretionary water use is the main driver of
seasonality because those use become more active as the temperature goes up.
Apart from seasonal differences in temperature that influence outdoor activities,
precipitation also should affect water demand because rainfall provides lawns or
gardens with water and reduces water demand.
Water use pattern in summer is considerably different compared to winter as
described above. Thus, it is likely that the effect of independent variables on water
demand could be substantially different between summer and winter. The key factor
that differentiates water use pattern is more intensive discretionary water use in
summer.
Because of higher proportion of discretionary water use in summer, people are more
responsive to changes in water price in summer. The price elasticity of water
demand for indoor uses is considerably lower than that for outdoor uses (Foster and
Beattie, 1967; Morgan and Smolen, 1990; Mansur and Olmstead, 2007). For
example, using a unique data set which differentiates indoor water use and outdoor
water use, Mansur and Olmstead (2007) report elasticity estimates of −0.0727 for
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indoor and −0.6836 for outdoor uses. This large difference between the price
elasticities of indoor and outdoor water demand implies greater responsiveness to
price in summer when the rate of discretionary water use is higher (Carver and
Boland, 1980; Howe, 1982; Griffin and Chang, 1990; Lyman, 1992).
Moreover, the possession of swimming pools and larger lawns and gardens are
positively correlated with income. This implies that the impact of income on water
demand can be considerably larger in summer than in winter. Finally, the
differences between the effects of climatic conditions in summer and winter could
also be not negligible. While Michelson et al. (1998) showed climate variables has
no statistically significant effects on water demand irrespective of the season,
Balling. et al. (2008) showed that larger lots, swimming pools, and larger mesic
landscapes are correlated with higher sensitivity to climate conditions, which
implies that sensitivity of water consumption to temperature and precipitation
might be higher in summertime, where outdoor uses comprise a larger part of
demand than in other seasons.
12
3. Data and Empirical
Methodology
Data
Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) has kept track of annual
residential water consumptions for all the municipalities in the Chicago
metropolitan area that use water from Lake Michigan. However, no intra-annual
water consumption data are readily available for Chicago area municipalities. The
use of monthly water consumption data is essential to capture the seasonality of
water use. In addition, since water prices can change intra-annually, and billing
typically is monthly or bimonthly, monthly consumption data align best with
household decision-making. Unfortunately, monthly water prices also are not readily
available. IDNR had conducted a water price survey every five years (1995, 2000,
and 2005) for all the municipalities in the Chicago metropolitan area that use water
from Lake Michigan. However, the survey produces observations at a particular
point in time. In order to specify water price correctly, knowledge of exactly when
price changes occurred is vital. Therefore, the most critical variables in this study
were not available at a satisfactory time-scale and had to be collected.
For monthly water consumption data, we first contacted the water utilities in the
Chicago metropolitan area that wholesale water to municipalities, hoping that they
had kept a historical record of water sales to each municipality. The wholesalers we
addressed were the City of Chicago, DuPage Water Commission, Central Lake
County Joint Action Water Agency, Evanston, Northwest Suburban Municipal
JAWA, Oak Lawn, and Waukegan. They did have water sales data for individual
13
municipalities, but, unfortunately, they were not able to distinguish residential,
commercial, and industrial water uses. Parallel to this investigation, using contact
information obtained from IDNR, we contacted 180 municipalities in the Chicago
Metropolitan area to obtain water tariff data for the period 1995 to 2007. We
requested the following information (see Appendix A for the request form):
1. Monthly water and sewer prices. For communities using block rate pricing, the
amount of water at which price changes and the price in each block were also
requested
2. Billing frequency-monthly, bimonthly, or otherwise.
3. Fixed cost, i.e., the payment each customer makes irrespective of the amount of
water consumed
4. An e-mail address and a phone number of the person in charge
Thirty-one municipalities provided us with their water tariff data. Via e-mail, we
subsequently asked for monthly residential water consumption data for the 31
municipalities for which we obtained the water tariff data. Some did not reply and
others did not retain the data. In the end, eight municipalities provided complete
water tariff and water consumption data: Addison, Buffalo Grove, Hoffman Estates,
Libertyville, Naperville, Orland Park, Plain Field, and Roselle.
Historical mean temperatures and precipitation data in the Chicago region were
obtained from NOAA weather stations around Chicago (see Table 3 for the complete
list of weather stations). Because the weather stations do not necessarily correspond
geographically to the municipalities of interest, the centroid of each municipality was
determined using ArcGIS and the adjacent weather station data were interpolated
to the centroids using Matlab (see Appendix B for the Matlab codes used).
Because consumption and price information are observed at the municipality level,
consumer characteristics also are aggregated. Socio-demographic data, namely
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median income, average household size, the number of households, and the number
of renter-occupied housing units (a proxy for rentals), were extracted from the 2000
decennial census and 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates.
The number of households and the number of renter-occupied housing units are not
directly included in the model, but they are used to obtain the average water use
and the rate of renter-occupied housing units, respectively. None of these variables
were collected in the years 1995 through 1999 and 2001 through 2005 and 2007. For
all these variables, except median income, linear interpolation and extrapolation are
used to fill the missing years. For income, linear interpolation and extrapolation
methods are questionable because it is susceptible to economic status. Instead, we
used annual income growth rates at county level obtained from the Survey of Small
Area Income & Poverty Estimates conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau5 (see
Appendix C for more details).
The definition of the variables and summary statistics are shown in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively.
Model construction
The dependent variable in this study is monthly average water consumption per
household, obtained by dividing monthly total water use by the number of
households. The use of monthly consumption data automatically defines the
time-frame of independent variables as monthly.
Specification of the water price
The specification of the water price variable has been the most controversial issue
in water demand estimation studies. Underlying the controversy is the common
practice of ”blockrate” pricing. With block rate price structures, the marginal
5http://www.census.gov//did/www/saipe/
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charge changes according to the amount of consumption. For example, a tariff of
$P1/gal might be charged for the first 1000 gallons consumed in a month. A
different tariff $P2/gal might be applied to the next 2000 gallons, and so forth.
Where P1 < P2 < . . . Pn, the price structure is termed ”increasing block rate.” If the
inequalities are reversed, then prices would have a ”decreasing block rate” structure.
From a statistical perspective, price and use are correlated because marginal price is
determined by use. The correlation of use and price could bias the coefficient
estimate on the water price variable unless some measures are taken. In our
application, there are two municipalities that did not use flat rate: Libertyville and
Orland Park (see Appendix E for their price structures). Orland Park started to use
increasing block rate from January, 2002. Libertyville charges minimum rate for the
first 4 kilo gallons and applies uniform rate after 4 kilo gallons. For example, in
2007, minimum rate was $22.20 and uniform rate was $4.18 per thousand gallons.
Therefore, residents face the marginal water price of 0 for the first 4 thousand
gallons. In this respect, this price structure can be regarded as an increasing block
rate. The inclusion of the data could bias the estimate of the coefficient on water
price if left untreated.
Most early studies employed the marginal price corresponding to the block rate
where the user (or with aggregate data, the typical user) consumed without taking
any measures to correct for potential bias (e.g., Howe and Linaweaver (1967)).
Then, in 1975, Taylor suggested adding a difference variable (D), defined as the
actual total payment minus the total amount a consumer would have paid if the
typical user consumed all units at the marginal price. Nordin (1976) showed that
the D variable should have the opposite sign as the income coefficient but the same
absolute magnitude. However, many studies that follow Nordin’s specification do
not support his claim that the magnitude is the same. Schefter and David (1985)
attributed the inconsistency to the use of aggregate data. They pointed out that
mean marginal price and mean difference are appropriate measures if the remaining
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variables are averages, and that these averages must be properly weighted by the
distribution of the numbers of users per block. The studies by Corral et al. (1998)
and Mart´ınez-Espin˜eira (2002b) use properly weighted marginal prices partly
because they are based on data for the actual water consumption of individual
households, and, thus know the exact marginal price of each one. Interestingly,
Mart´ınez-Espin˜eira (2002b) empirically showed that the water price elasticity
estimated with Nordin’s specification is not significantly different from one based on
a properly weighted marginal price and D variable. Unfortunately, household data
were not available for our study. So, we assume that the typical user consumes the
average amount of water each month. Based on this assumption, we calculate the
marginal water price and the D variable. As Schefter and David (1985) pointed out,
this specification inevitably biases the estimate of water price elasticity because it
assumes all households consume in the same block. The price specification in this
study also precludes testing for different income effects in summer and winter.
Compared to winter, more customers are expected to consume in the second block
in summer. If the water use distribution were available, properly weighted marginal
price could be computed and the D variable should be higher in summer and lower
in winter. Instead, our approach encompasses two extreme cases. All consumers are
assumed to consume in either the first price block or the second price block
depending on how much water the typical household consumes in that month. Even
though this is not the best way to deal with block rate pricing, this is the best that
can be done with our data set.
Functional form
In water demand studies, the functional form of water consumption has usually
been linear, double-log, or log-linear. The most common functional form is linear
(e.g, Agthe and Billings (1980), Stevens et al. (1992), Corral et al. (1998), Pint
(1999), Mart´ınez-Espin˜eira (2002a)). The linear functional form implies that the
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rate of changes in water consumption to changes in the water price is constant6.
This implies that the elasticity of water demand decreases in absolute magnitude as
price decreases along the demand curve. In contrast, the double-log functional form
imposes constant price elasticity along the demand curve (e.g, Renwick and Green
(2000), Nauges and Thomas (2000), Nieswiadomy (1992)). This functional form is
widely used because of the ease of obtaining the price elasticity estimates. It also
implies that the same absolute increases in the water price achieve larger amount of
water demand reduction when the water demand level is higher and the water price
level is lower7. The log-linear functional form implies that the same absolute
increases in the water price becomes larger when the water consumption level is
higher, but is not affected by the price level unlike the double-log8. Examples that
used log-linear functional form are Lyman (1992) and Renzetti (1992).
The linear functional form implies that there exists a choke price, where water
consumption is zero (Arbue´s et al., 2003), while the double-log and log-linear
functional forms avoid this. However, this won’t be of concern in this study because
the ranges of the demand and water price are rather narrow.
There is no consensus on which functional form to use. Therefore, all three
functional forms are tried in this study.
As noted above, water price elasticity is known to be affected by the income level.
The municipality-level income data for our study have insufficient cross-sectional
variation to follow the classification methodology of Renwick and Archibald (1998)
or Olmstead and Stavins (2008). Moreover, real income has increased consistently
throughout the years covered, making it difficult to place a municipality into a
single income class throughout the studied period. Thus, instead of classifying
communities by income, we interact water price with median real annual household
income in order to investigate the degree to which income affects the price elasticity
6∂AW = β × ∂WP , where β is a coefficient estimate
7∂AW = β × AW
P
∂WP
8∂AW = β ×AW∂WP
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of water demand.
Discretionary water use is associated with warm weather and is the main
contributor to variability in water quantity demanded throughout the year. To
capture the seasonality of water consumption we include a summer dummy that
takes the value of 1 in June, July, August, September, and October, otherwise 0. In
addition, four terms are interacted with the summer dummy in order to capture
seasonal differences of water consumption. First, water price is interacted to test for
seasonal differences in water price elasticity. The second interaction is with income
to capture the difference in water use in summer between higher income households
and lower income households. The other interactions are with temperature and
precipitation to find out the seasonal difference in the impact of climate variables on
water demand. Other variables included in the models are the fixed water charge,
household size, and the rate of renter-occupied housing units to total housing units.
The three models to be estimated are as follows (The definition of the variables are
shown in Table 1);
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11WP · ln(Y )
+ β312WP · SD + β313ln(Y ) · SD + β314R · SD + µ3 (3)
, where βij represents the coefficient for model i on independent variable j, µ− i
represents the error term.
Estimation methodology
Our data set has a panel structure with 8 cross-sectional observations and 14
years (168 months) at its longest. The panel is unbalanced, as the length of each
series is not consistent. In addition, data were not available regarding ownership of
swimming pools and lot sizes for each municipality. This is unfortunate because
these have both shown to explain water demand variation. However, they are
correlated strongly with income (e.g, Howe and Linaweaver (1967), Nieswiadomy
and Molina (1989), Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), and Dandy et al. (1997)). Thus,
due to omitted variables, this model violates the necessary condition for unbiased
OLS estimation.
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In order to minimize the bias, a fixed effects estimation method is applied. In the
fixed effect model, the swimming pool and lot size variables are embedded in a
municipality-specific unobserved term. By taking differences across the consecutive
time periods, the municipality-specific unobserved term is eliminated. Moreover, the
fixed effects model allows for correlation between the unobserved term and
explanatory variables for its consistent estimation. Some water demand studies
apply a random effects model, which is a more efficient estimation method for panel
data (e.g., Mart´ınez-Espin˜eira (2002b)). However, the random effects model does
not allow for correlation between unobserved terms and explanatory variables for
consistent estimation. Since this condition will not hold for our data set, this study
applies only the fixed effects model.
The elimination of the unobserved term in the fixed effect model is based on the
assumption that lot sizes and possession of swimming pools did not change within a
municipality over time. Therefore, even though this approach neutralizes the risk of
potential omitted variable bias arising from cross-sectional variance in lot sizes and
ownership of swimming pools, the fixed effects model still has a potential risk of
omitted variable bias from relative changes in those characteristics over time.
Moreover, minimization of the potential risk of omitted variable bias does not come
for free. Fixed effect estimation involves a loss of the cross-sectional variance in the
independent variables, thus rendering the estimation less efficient.
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4. Results
Three fixed effect models are estimated9. The results appear in Table 4. All
three models are very similar in terms of the statistical significance of climate and
household characteristics variables. This indicates that estimation results for those
variables are robust across the functional forms. However, there exist notable
differences in statistical significance when it comes to water price, income, and their
interaction terms. While both water price and its interaction with income are
statistically significantly in the linear and log-linear models, they are not in the
double-log model. However, this does not seem to indicate that double-log
functional form is an inappropriate form. Rather, their statistical insignificance is
likely to be the consequence of the small variance in the logarithmic transformation
of the water price and income variables. The inclusion of interaction terms may also
be to blame because it introduces stronger multicolinearity. For further
interpretation of the results, the log-linear model is used as it shows the best fit in
terms of the statistical significance.
Water price
The coefficient on the water price is negative and statistically significant.
However, water price is also included in two interaction terms, so these terms must
also be taken into account in order to understand the effect of changes in the water
price on water demand. As can be seen from Table 4, income has a statistically
9see Appendix D for OLS estimation
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significant positive effect (a negative absolute effect) on the price elasticity of water
demand, i.e., the elasticity approaches zero as income increases. Thus, the higher
the income, the less sensitive people are to a change in water price. This finding
accords with the findings of Renwick and Archibald (1998), Agthe and Billings
(1987), and Mansur and Olmstead (2007). In addition, summer has a statistically
significant negative correlation with the price elasticity of water demand. That is,
the elasticity becomes more negative and greater in absolute value in summer. This
result reflects the higher proportion of discretionary use in warmer season as argued
by Lyman (1992) and Arbue´s et al. (2003). Considering these interactions together
with the direct effect of price, the point estimates of the water price elasticity of a
municipality with the sample average income of $64, 506 and the water price of
$3.91 is −0.052 in winter season and −0.172 in summer. The 95% confidence
interval of them are .065 to −.17 and −.053 to −.292, respectively.10 Dalhuisen
et al. (2003) reports that most of the point estimates of price elasticity lies from 0 to
−1 with few exceptions. The point estimates of the price elasticity in this study is
also within the range.
Figures 1 and 2 show the series of point estimates of water price elasticity against
income level. While in summer all the point estimates of water price elasticities are
less than zero, in winter, they are greater than 0 at certain range of the income level.
This result contrasts with expectations based on theory. However, 95% confidence
interval in the case of the highest nominal price elasticity is −.09 to .34. Therefore,
the highest estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero.
10Wintertime and summertime elasticities are calculated by plugging in the value of mean income $64, 506 and the










= (−.592 + .139× ln(Income)− .0308) ∗WaterPrice for summer.
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Potential biases
As discussed above, point estimates for water price elasticity are larger than zero
at some income levels, even though none of them are statistically significantly
different from zero. This casts some doubt about the unbiasedness of the coefficient
on water price-related variables. Most of the potential sources of biased estimators
seem to arise from the aggregate nature of this study. Aggregating data at the
municipal level has an inherent risk of biased estimators because there is a large loss
of information on the true heterogeneity among households. Moreover, aggregate
data prohibited us from treating block rate pricing in more sophisticated ways as
the discrete continuous model used by Olmstead et al. (2007). Therefore, incorrect
specification of the water price could have biased the estimation.
Another potential source of bias is the inclusion of multifamily housing units, such
as apartments, that are inseparable in our aggregate consumption data. They may
have been billed a fixed charge by the land owner. They do not have an incentive to
conserve water when they are billed a fixed charge. The inability to separate out
water consumption by households whose water bills are fixed could negatively bias
the absolute value of the estimates of water price elasticity. It is possible that the
higher the rate of renter households, the less responsive a municipality is to changes
in the water price. In order to avoid this type of bias, we need to differentiate water
consumption from those who only pay fixed amount. Alternatively, with household
level data, the marginal water price could be set to zero for those who pay only
fixed amount. The data for this study does not allow either correction measure.
The assumption of invariant household characteristics over time within a
municipality, namely, garden sizes and the possession of swimming pools might be
to blame. For example, if the average garden size becomes larger while the water
price becomes higher, the estimate of the coefficient on the water price would be
biased positively in nominal value, thus dampening the price elasticity (Further
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discussions on these issues are in Appendix D.).
Aside from potential biases, unresponsiveness to changes in the water price can be
attributed to the generally high income levels of the municipalities considered in
this study. According to the 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year
Estimates, median household income in Cook, DuPage, Lake, and Will counties
were about $52, 550, $73, 820, $77, 900, and $71, 600, respectively. Addison, the least
well-off among our sample, has a median household income of $62, 533. Other
municipalities had median incomes greater than $75, 000. Libertyville and
Plainfield, in particular, are wealthy, with median incomes of $106, 337 and
$101, 958, respectively. Therefore, our study deals with municipalities with high
income levels compared to the average.
Other variables
Socio-demographic variables
Because the income variable is included in logarithmic form in the third model,
the coefficient on income represents the income elasticity. The coefficient on income
itself is negative but is not statistically significantly different from zero. As with the
water price, however, the interaction terms also need to be considered to fully
understand how income affects water demand. In winter, the 95% confidence
interval at mean price is −0.216 to 0.287. This indicates that income does not have
large effect on water demand in winter. This is probably because discretionary
water use in winter is limited. On the other hand, in summer, the 95% confidence
interval is 0.193 to 0.710. Thus, in summer, the income elasticity of water demand
is statistically different from 0 at 5% level and water demand is more sensitive to
income in summer. According to Dalhuisen et al. (2003), the income elasticity in
most of the studies lies from 0 to 1. Therefore, this study is in line with the
previous studies.
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The coefficient on household size is positive, but the impact is statistically
insignificant. This is not surprising considering the inability of this study to correct
for characteristics of housing units. A small amount of variability in the community
averages over time and across municipalities is also probably to blame for statistical
insignificance.
Weather variables
The estimated coefficient on precipitation is positive but not statistically
different from zero. When the interaction with summer is included, however, the
overall effect is negative and statistically significant. Thus, Chicago-area water
demand is sensitive to precipitation during the summer but not in other seasons.
When monthly precipitation is 1 inch below average in summer, residential water
uses would increase about 1.4%.11 This result is consistent with the findings of
Balling. et al. (2008) and reflects the importance of outdoor water use in summer.
The temperature variable and its interaction terms are included in order to
investigate the sensitivity of water demand. Both variables are significant and have
the expected signs. Higher temperature leads to larger amount of water use in both
summer and winter. However, the magnitudes of the impact are very different. A
one point rise in temperature would increase water demand by about 0.13% in
winter and 1.3% 12 in summer. Thus, temperature has much larger impacts on
water demand in summer than in winter. This is probably because many-water
intensive activities that are sensitive to temperature do not occur in wintertime.
11 ∂AW
AW
× 100 = (−0.0156 + 0.00187)× ∂R× 100
12 ∂AW
AW
× 100 = (0.0113 + 0.00132)× ∂ST × 100
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5. Discussions and Conclusions
As stated in chapter 1, water price elasticity is of particular interest because
water pricing is one demand management policy lever available to managers. In this
chapter, we derive implications from our findings for water pricing strategies in the
Chicago Metropolitan area. Specifically, we derive policy implications from the
effects of income on water price elasticity. In addition, because water infrastructure
is the biggest contributor to the production costs of water and is designed to meet
the peak summertime water demand, we also pay special attention to summertime
water consumption.
It is important to reiterate that our results are limited by the data available to us,
particularly concerning the structure of water prices. In the U.S., an increasing
number of water utilities have come to apply increasing block rates to promote
conservation (Hanemann, 1997). In 1992, only 4% of residential customers faced
increasing block rates. However, in 2002, one-third of them were faced with
increasing block rates (Olmstead et al., 2007). In Illinois, however, flat rates are still
dominant. Dziegielewski et al. (2004) reported that out of 426 systems sampled, 132
were still using decreasing block rates and only 16 were using increasing block rate.
Our data set included six municipalities which use uniform prices and two that have
increasing block rates. Because the data are community aggregates, we were unable
to examine the potential for differences between these two rate structures. We
effectively assume that all communities in the study use flat rate structures.
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Effects of income on water price elasticity
Income plays a crucial role in determining water demand and has important
implications for water pricing. As shown in the previous chapter, the median
income level has a statistically significant positive effect on water price elasticity.
Table 5 and Table 6 show wintertime and summertime water price elasticities for
three municipalities: Addison, Roselle, and Naperville, respectively representing
low-income, middle-income, and high income communities. As can be seen, the
water price elasticity of Addison is relatively high, while that of Naperville is almost
zero. This indicates that responsiveness to water price could be considerably
different depending on the income level. In accord with previous studies, water price
increases would have relatively more effect on consumption in municipalities with
lower incomes. In higher-income municipalities, price increases could merely result
in a revenue raising policy without achieving significant water demand reduction.
As Olmstead and Stavins (2008) point out, the gap in water price elasticities could
raise a clear equity issue, which is an important concern for water managers when
implementing water pricing. Suppose RWSG set out water price increase of the
same degree applied universally to municipalities in Northeastern Illinois in order to
achieve 5% water use reduction. The contribution to water use reduction would be
unevenly distributed among municipalities with lower income municipalities
contributing more.
Table 7 shows the necessary price increase to achieve a 3% annual water
conservation for each municipality. For Addison, as little as a 7.44% increase in
water price would achieve the goal. On the other hand, for Naperville, an 54%
increase in water price would be required to reduce water consumption by 3%.
Equity on the quantity side would be accomplished at the cost of considerable
differences in price adjustments. Moreover, price increases in water are known to
confront strong oppositions from residents
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Summertime water use
The results indicate that residential customers are more responsive to water price
changes in summer than in winter. Thus, the same proportional increase in water
price should achieve more water conservation in summer vis-a-vis winter. Water use
reduction in summer is especially valuable since it would avoid or delay future
costly investments in water infrastructures. In fact, according to the water utilities
survey done by CMAP in 2008, at the time of peak demand, 42 out of 170 water
supply utilities are operating at over 75% of their capacity, and 70 of them are
considering expanding their capacity within 5 years. These facts suggest an
advantage of seasonal pricing policy, with higher prices in the summer.
The seasonal difference in water price elasticity in these Chicago-area communities
is not as large as reported in some other studies. For Moscow, ID, Lyman (1992)
reports a water price elasticity of −1.354 for peak-season and −0.444 for off-peak
season. For Adelaide, South Australia, Dandy et al. (1997) report a range of −0.69
to −0.86 for summer and −0.29 to −0.45 for winter. This empirical gap might be
attributable to the climatic conditions where these studies were conducted. In
Moscow, ID, and Adelaide, Australia, both in more ared areas, discretionary water
use for landscaping in summer may be more extensive than in the Chicago area.
Therefore, the relative effectiveness of seasonal water pricing would not be as high
in Chicago.
Policy makers can take advantage of greater price responses in summertime. In this
connection, consider two policies.
(1) Price increases in all months to conserve 3% of annual water use.
(2) Price increases only in summer months to conserve 3% of annual water use.
Table 8 compares the year-round and summer water price increases required to
produce theses reductions in the representative communities. The difference
between water price increases of the two cases is the smallest for Naperville. This is
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because its residents are highly unresponsive to water prices in winter time due to
high income that the amount of water conservation in winter season is limited.
Table 9 calculates the annual household expenditures for water for the two cases.
The first column shows the annual expenditures in 2007 for the three municipalities.
The second and third columns represent the annual expenditure for water a
household would face, respectively, for the cases 1 and 2.The summertime-only
pricing hurts households’ budget less than annual pricing even though they achieve
the same amount of water conservation. The difference in the expenditures of the
two cases becomes more striking as the seasonal price elasticity differential
increases. Naperville would benefit most from summertime pricing. In addition, an
immediate and important consequence of summertime pricing instead of
non-seasonal pricing is lower water use in the peak load summer period. Figure 3
compares expected water uses in summer months for the two policies in Addison.
The peak demand in case 2 is less than that in case 1 because, in case 2,
contributions to the 3% water conservation come only from summer months.
Summertime water pricing could do more to slow the need for added system
capacity. Moreover, as Mansur and Olmstead (2007) show, the difference in water
price elasticities between summer and winter can be attributable to the
intensiveness of outdoor water use, implying that summertime water conservation
comes mainly from discretionary uses. Therefore, summertime water pricing might
not harm basic needs as much as non-seasonal pricing.
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6. Summary
The main objective of this study was to determine what factors affect water
demand in the Chicago Metropolitan area in particular and add to water demand
literature concerning how water price elasticity varies with income level and seasons.
Higher income municipalities were shown to be less responsive to changes in the
water price as shown in Renwick and Archibald (1998), Agthe and Billings (1987),
and Mansur and Olmstead (2007). This implies that the use of water pricing for
conservation raises equity issues for consumers. Water use exhibits strong
seasonality because of the higher proportion of discretionary water use in summer.
Because of this, summertime water demand is much more sensitive to many factors.
First, the water price elasticity was shown to be higher in absolute value in summer
compared to winter, which suggests a seasonal pricing strategy with higher prices in
summer. Second, in summer, higher-income municipalities consume more water
than lower-income communities probably because higher-income municipalities tend
to have more water-intensive amenities. Finally, water demand in summer is much
more sensitive to climate variables, namely, rainfall and temperature.
Even though important insights into residential water demand in the Chicago
Metropolitan area were derived from this study, a lack of data limited this study.
Specifically, the small size of the sample, the use of aggregate rather than
household-level observations, and the lack of data on lot sizes and swimming pools
compromised the analysis. Complete historical data on the latter variables, in
particular, could enable us to use random effects estimation, which is more efficient
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estimation than fixed effects estimation. The use of household level data would free
the estimation from biases that aggregate data inevitably introduce and allow for
more rigorous treatments of block rate pricing as in Olmstead et al. (2007).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Definition of variables and data source
Variables Description/unit Source
AW Monthly average water usage (1000 gallons) per house-
hold, gained by dividing monthly total residential wa-
ter usage by the number of households.
Mail Survey
WP Residential water price ($), obtained by combining wa-
ter and sewer prices. Deflated by CPI to 1995 dollars.
Mail Survey
Y Median real household income ($1000), deflated by
CPI to 1995 dollars.
Decennial census 2000 & 2005-2007
American community survey 3-year es-
timates
HS Average household size Decennial census 2000 & 2005-2007
American community survey 3-year es-
timates
RR The rate of renter-occupied housing units to the total
housing units
Decennial census 2000 & 2005-2007
American community survey 3-year es-
timates
D Difference variable ($) as defined by Nordin (1976)
FC Fixed charge imposed on each customer, deflated by
CPI to 1995 dollars ($)
Mail survey
R Monthly precipitation (inches) National Climatic Data Center
T Mean temperature calculated with the method men-
tioned above
National Climatic Data Center
ln(P ) · ln(Y ) Interaction term between ln(P) and ln(Y)
ln(P ) · SD Interaction term between ln(P) and SD
ln(Y ) · SD Interaction term between ln(Y) and SD
R · SD Interaction term between R and SD
T · SD Interaction term between T and SD
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Sd Min Max
Average water use (AWU) 877 5.731833 1.947344 5.731833 16.29822
Water price (WP) 877 3.89865 1.674118 3.89865 7.39244
Income (Y) 877 62.2053 10.98587 62.2053 84.57707
Household size (HS) 877 2.858792 .1926469 2.858792 5.121
Fixed charge (FC) 877 3.198557 4.52037 3.198557 17.48934
Precipitation (R) 877 2.906299 1.890755 2.906299 12.03
Temperature (T) 877 49.78191 17.82221 49.78191 79.376
Rate of renters (RR) 877 .17834 .0724916 .17834 .3450043
Table 3: Weather stations
Station State County Station State County
Barrington 3SW IL Cook Yorkville 3 SW IL Kendall
Chicago Botanical GDN IL Cook Antioch IL Lake
Chicago Ohare INT LAP IL Cook Barrington 3SW IL Cook
Chicago Northerly IS IL Cook Gurnee Public Works IL Lake
Chicago Midway AP IL Cook Lake Villa 2NE IL Lake
Chicago Midway AP 3SW IL Cook Libertyville 4 NNW IL Lake
Elk Grove Village IL Cook Mundelein 4WSW IL Lake
La Grange IL Cook Waukegan IL Lake
Lansing IL Cook Waukegan 2 IL Lake
Little Red School HSE IL Cook Crown Point 1N IN Lake
Mt Prospect IL Cook Hobart 2 WNW IN Lake
Park Forest IL Cook Lowell IN Lake
Park Ridge IL Cook Merrillvile 2 W IN Lake
Streamwood IL Cook Crystal Lake 4 NW IL Mchenry
De Kalb IL Dekalb Harvard IL Mchenry
Genoa 2 SW IL Dekalb Marengo IL Mchenry
Shabbona 3S IL Dekalb Mchenry Stratton L&D IL Mchenry
Glen Ellyn 4S IL DuPage Spring Grove IL Mchenry
Lisle-Morton Arboretum IL DuPage Woodstock 5 NW IL Mchenry
Oak Brook 2W IL DuPage Hales Corners-Whitnall WI Milwaukee
Wheaton 3 SE IL DuPage Milwaukee Mt Mary Col WI Milwaukee
Channahon Dresden IS IL Grundy Milwaukee Mitchell AP WI Milwaukee
Gebhard Woods SP IL Grundy South Milwaukee WWTP WI Milwaukee
Morris 1 NW IL Grundy West Allis WI Milwaukee
Aurora IL Kane Bartonville 5SW IL Peoria
Elburn IL Kane Chillicothe IL Peoria
Elgin IL Kane Peoria AP 3SW IL Peoria
Hampshire 8 SE IL Kane Peoria 5NW IL Peoria
St Charles 7 NW IL Kane Peoria GTR Peoria AP IL Peoria
Bourbonnais 3NW IL Kankakee Princeville 2W IL Peoria
Chebanse IL Kankakee Trivoli IL Peoria
Chebanse 5 E River IL Kankakee Elwood 8 NW IL WILL
Kankakee Metro WWTP IL Kankakee Joliet Brandon RD Dam IL WILL
Momence 5 ENE IL Kankakee Manhattan 4 SW IL WILL
Reddick 2 NE IL Kankakee Monee RSVR IL WILL
St Anne IL Kankakee Peotone IL WILL
Newark 2 SSE IL Kemdall Plainfield 3 NE IL WILL
Planc IL Kendall Romeoville Lewis Univ AP IL WILL
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Table 4: Regression results
Linear Double-log Log-linear
AWU ln(AWU) ln(AWU)




ln(Income) -3.406 -0.359 -0.501
(-1.57) (-0.95) (-1.72)




Water Price×Summer Dummy -0.199∗∗∗ -0.0308∗∗∗
(-4.55) (-5.27)
ln(Water Price)×Summer Dummy -0.0923∗∗∗
(-4.56)
ln(Income)×Summer Dummy 3.455∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗
(8.51) (7.54) (7.39)
D -0.404∗∗∗ -0.0597∗∗∗ -0.0495∗∗∗
(-4.49) (-4.64) (-4.11)
Fixed Charge 0.0748 0.0224∗ 0.0181∗
(1.11) (2.12) (2.01)
Summer Dummy -17.09∗∗∗ -1.996∗∗∗ -1.946∗∗∗
(-9.54) (-8.23) (-8.11)
Precipitation 0.0120 0.00165 0.00187
(0.39) (0.40) (0.45)
Precipitation×Summer Dummy -0.116∗∗ -0.0156∗∗ -0.0159∗∗
(-2.85) (-2.85) (-2.91)
Temperature 0.00624 0.00132∗ 0.00132∗
(1.45) (2.27) (2.28)
Temperature×Summer Dummy 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗
(11.66) (10.94) (11.00)
Household Size 0.190 0.0185 0.0195
(0.38) (0.28) (0.29)
Rate of Renters -3.239 -0.489 -0.541
(-1.13) (-1.25) (-1.40)
Constant 18.70∗ 3.165 3.644∗∗
(1.98) (1.96) (2.88)
R2 0.6159 0.6604 0.6632
N 877 877 877
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Wintertime water price elasticity
Municipalities Real income Point Upper Lower($1000) estimate bound bound
Addison 45.9 -.320 -.032 -.649
Roselle 58.0 -.189 .042 -.419
Naperville 71.4 .002 .092 -.088
Table 6: Summertime water price elasticity
Municipalities Real income Point Upper Lower($1000) estimate bound bound
Addison 45.9 -.513 -.206 -.820
Roselle 58.0 -.394 -.162 -.627
Naperville 71.4 -.088 .004 -.180
Table 7: Necessary water price increase to achieve 3% water conservation
Municipalities Increase in WP(%) Current price($) price after($)
Addison 7.44 7.70 8.27
Roselle 11.16 8.92 9.92
Naperville 54.33 4.00 6.17
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Table 8: Necessary summertime water price increase to achieve 3% water conservation




Table 9: Differences in expenditures to achieve 3% water conservation
Municipalities No price increase Expenditure for Expenditure foryear-round pricing summertime only pricing
Addison $359.9 $375.1 $369.6
Roselle $524.2 $580.9 $547.4
Naperville $318.0 $573.6 $434.0
Figure 1: Distribution of price elasticity in winter
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Figure 2: Distribution of price elasticity in summer
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Figure 3: Comparison of expected water use: Addison (In Thousand Gallons)
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Appendix B: Matlab Codes
1 fid=fopen('centroids small.txt');
2 c = textscan(fid,...













16 fid = feval(@fopen,s);
17 p = textscan(fid,...




22 [XI YI] = meshgrid(−87.30:−.001:−88.30,41.40:.001:42.5);
23 ZI = griddata(p{2},p{1},p{3},XI,YI);
24
25 ppt(:,i) = interp2(XI,YI,ZI,c{1},c{2},'cubic');
26
27 end
28 csvwrite('Meantemp 1995.csv',[double(c{3}) ppt]);
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Appendix C: Income Calibration
Table C-1 shows historical record of county level median incomes. Directly
applying the county level growth rates to municipality level median incomes for
1999 results in mismatched incomes at 2006, as the case of Addison shown in Table
C-2. In the table, in 2006, the median income from the Census is 62.35, while that
obtained by simply applying the income growth rate is 59.98. Therefore, this rates
needs to be adjusted in order for the 2006 median income data to match up. The
process of adjustment is following;
Adjusted growth rate = 1+(growth rate -1)×62.35−54.09
59.98−54.09
We applied this adjusted income growth rates to fill the missing years except 1996,
where no county level income data is available. To obtain the value of income at
1996, we simply interpolate the value at 1995 and 1997.
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Table C-1: County level income trends
Year Cook DuPage Lake Will
1995 37.82 59.60 59.53 52.28
1997 40.18 62.83 63.35 54.06
1998 41.82 64.37 63.47 57.16
1999 43.13 66.45 65.55 60.49
2000 45.24 68.69 66.69 62.94
2001 43.57 67.38 67.50 62.76
2002 42.86 64.35 68.09 63.07
2003 42.72 64.38 66.45 63.47
2004 43.58 66.70 67.04 66.42
2005 48.92 70.61 69.17 68.59
2006 50.68 73.69 75.16 72.86
2007 52.55 73.82 77.90 71.60
Source: Survey of Small Area Income & Poverty Estimates
Table C-2: Income calibration for Addison
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Income from Census 54.09 NA NA NA NA NA NA 62.53
Income with non-adjusted 54.09 55.91 54.85 52.38 52.40 54.29 57.47 59.98
Income growth rate
Growth rate 1.000 1.034 1.014 0.968 0.969 1.004 1.063 1.109
Adjusted growth rate 1.000 1.048 1.020 0.955 0.955 1.005 1.090 1.156
Calibrated income 54.09 56.70 55.18 51.64 51.67 54.38 58.94 62.53
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Appendix D: Estimation Methods
Selection And Potential Biases
Estimation methods
Table D-1 show the regression results with OLS and fixed effects estimation
methods. In order to see clearly the sign of the coefficient on the water price, its
interaction with income is dropped out from the model. As, can be seen in Table
D-1, OLS estimation gives the statistically significantly positive coefficient on the
water price. This is probably because lot sizes and ownership of swimming pools are
positively correlated cross-sectionaly with the water price, thus biasing the effect of
the water price on water demand positively. On the other hand, fixed effects
estimator gives the negative coefficient estimate of the water price, even though it is
not statistically significantly different from zero. Therefore, OLS seems to be an
inappropriate estimation method in this study.
Potential biases
Mistreatment of block rate pricing could have biased the estimate of the
coefficient on variables related to the water price. For an experimental purpose, we
drop the observations of Orland Park and Libertyville, which use block rate pricing,
and rerun the model. Even though dropping a part of the observations always
accompanies potential risk of sample selection bias, the results might give us some
insights into potential bias from block rate pricing. Table D-2 compares the
regression results between the full sample and the sample without Orland Park and
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Libertyville. The magnitude of coefficients on the water price and its interaction
with income are larger compared to the full sample. Moreover, the 95% confidence
intervals of them are also larger. These are probably because the accuracy of
estimation went down because of the smaller sample size. Figures D-1 and D-2
compare the distribution of wintertime price elasticity of municipalities without
Orland Park and Libertyville against income levels, calculated based on the
estimation results from the full sample and the sample without Orland park and
Libertyville, respectively. The latter still has positive point estimates of price
elasticity and has wider range of price elasticities. According to these facts, it seems
block rate pricing might not have strongly biased the estimators in winter. However,
when it comes to water price elasticities in summer, there are distinctive differences.
As shown in Table D-2, when Libertyville and Orland Park are dropped out of the
full sample, an interaction between the water price and summer dummy is no longer
statistically significant. Figures D-3 show the distributions of the summertime price
elasticity for the sample without the two municipalities. As can be seen, at higher
income levels, point estimates of water price elasticities are over zero. This contrasts
to the fact that all of them are below zero for the full sample as shown in 2. This
might be because either sample selection bias, bias from block rate pricing, or
combination of both factors. However, statistical insignificance of the interaction
term between the water price and summer dummy for the subsample is rather odd
because empirical studies, Lyman (1992), Olmstead et al. (2007), and Dandy et al.
(1997) consistently show that people are much more elastic in summer compared to
winter. This indicates the existence of another potential source of bias. Specifically,
the assumption of invariant household characteristics over time within a
municipality, namely, garden sizes and the possession of swimming pools might be
responsible. For example, if the average garden size becomes larger while the water
price becomes higher, the estimate of the coefficient on the water price would be
biased positively in nominal value, thus dampening the price elasticity. In fact, this
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explains the fact that the estimate of summertime water price elasticity is more
susceptible for selection of samples, because garden sizes and possession of
swimming pools are related to higher water consumption in summer but not as
much in winter. Therefore, price elasticity might be negatively biased in absolute
value, especially in summer.
Table D-3 shows the regression results for a version of the model that adds an
interaction term between the water price and the rate of renter-occupied housing
units. If this interaction term is an accurate proxy, it should have a positive
coefficient. However, it is negative and statistically insignificant. In this study, it
would appear that the rate of renter-occupied housing units primarily reflects the
rate of low-income households.
Table D-4 compares estimation results of the model without all the interaction
terms and the original model. As can be seen, when all the interaction terms are left
out, the water price does not have statistically significant effect on water demand.
However, we know that water price elasticity could have statistically significant
impact on water demand depending on the income level and the season, as discussed
in the results section. Moreover, Table D-4 tells that both temperature and
precipitation has statistically significant effect on water demand throughout a year
when the interactions with summer dummy are not included. However, inclusion of
interaction terms reveals that water demand is actually not sensitive to both of
them in winter, while it is in summer. Therefore, not including the interaction
terms could be misleading as well as lack of policy implications.
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Table D-1: Regression results with OLS and fixed effects estimation
OLS Fixed effects




Water price×Summer dummy -0.0276∗∗∗ -0.0317∗∗∗
(-3.95) (-5.42)




Fixed Charge -0.00958∗∗∗ 0.00946
(-5.68) (1.16)








Temperature×Summer dummy 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗
(9.15) (10.88)
Household Size -0.154∗∗∗ 0.0344
(-4.07) (0.52)





t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D-2: Regression results with different samples
Full Without Orland Park
Sample and Libertyville




Water price×ln(Income) 0.139∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(2.21) (4.31)
Water price×Summer dummy -0.0308∗∗∗ 0.00268
(-5.27) (0.40)




Fixed charge 0.0181∗ 0.0421∗∗∗
(2.01) (4.08)








Temperature×Summer dummy 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗
(11.00) (9.16)
Household size 0.0195 -0.0138
(0.29) (-0.22)






t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D-3: Regression results with an added interaction term between water price and rate of renters
Original With the
Model interaction




Water price×ln(Income) 0.139∗ 0.0509
(2.21) (0.50)
Water price×Summer dummy -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.0312∗∗∗
(-5.27) (-5.33)
Water price×Rate of renters -0.341
(-1.09)




Fixed charge 0.0181∗ 0.0221∗
(2.01) (2.27)








Temperature×Summer dummy 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗
(11.00) (11.00)
Household size 0.0195 0.0141
(0.29) (0.21)






t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D-4: Estimation results with different independent variables
Without interaction With interaction
terms terms






Fixed Charge 0.0103 0.0181∗
(1.13) (2.01)






Household Size -0.00910 0.0195
(-0.12) (0.29)















t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure D-1: Distribution of price elasticity calculated for municipalities except both municipalities
based on the estimation results from the full sample
Figure D-2: Distribution of price elasticity calculated for municipalities except both municipalities
based on the estimation results from the sample without both municipalities
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Figure D-3: Distribution of summertime price elasticity calculated for municipalities except both
Orland Park and Libertyville, based on the estimation results from the sample without both munic-
ipalities
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Appendix E: Selected Data
Water consumption
Table E-1: Historical record of average water consumption per household (by 1000 gallons): Addison
year/month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1995 3.69 4.12 4.29 3.28 3.32 4.25 4.65 5.1 4.52 4.1 4.1 3.58
1996 3.68 3.44 3.42 3.28 3.73 3.62 3.82 5.19 5 4.46 4.02 3.58
1997 3.7 4.04 4.17 3.62 3.67 3.87 2.81 4.89 4.79 4.52 3.87 3.8
1998 3.77 4.13 4.08 3.43 3.57 3.69 3.71 4.99 4.13 3.21 4.04 2.58
1999 3.73 3.96 3.52 3.37 3.72 4.23 4.26 5.53 4.78 4.72 3.94 3.94
2000 3.95 4.39 3.56 3.56 3.81 4.13 3.87 5.13 4.92 4.87 3.9 3.97
2001 3.87 4.06 3.86 3.61 3.62 4.22 3.99 4.52 4.54 4.86 4.03 4.21
2002 4.75 4.47 3.25 3.86 3.76 3.99 4.1 5.64 5.15 4.55 3.9 3.84
2003 3.76 3.78 3.46 3.57 3.71 4.11 3.61 5.6 5.32 4.87 3.98 3.71
2004 3.86 4.22 3.91 3.7 3.62 4.29 3.57 4.63 4.51 4.54 3.85 3.93
2005 4.16 4.28 3.15 3.08 3.69 3.96 4.17 4.62 4.5 4.78 3.86 3.81
2006 4.15 3.93 3.38 3.43 3.71 4.17 5.04 6.53 3.18 4.37 3.8 3.39
2007 3.63 3.68 3.5 3.5 3.42 3.92 4.39 4.83 4.59 4.13 3.61 3.54
Table E-2: Historical record of average water consumption per household (by 1000 gallons): Buffalo
Grove
year/month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1995 4.59 4.37 4.2 4.29 5.28 6.5 7.6 6.65 5.57 5.43 4.63 4.49
1996 4.5 4.4 4.36 4.62 4.75 5.29 7.48 7.21 6.06 5.65 4.62 4.62
1997 4.48 4.75 4.92 4.47 4.89 5.48 6.56 6.32 5.41 5.39 4.82 4.37
1998 4.1 4.38 4.57 4.62 5.71 6.14 7.14 7.46 6.2 5.26 4.55 4.43
1999 4.16 4.44 4.55 4.72 5.58 6.15 8.51 8.68 6.79 5.96 4.85 4.6
2000 4.3 4.16 4.24 4.78 5.29 5.2 6.63 6.86 5.73 5.13 4.61 4.69
2001 3.99 3.86 4.39 4.55 5.11 5.96 7.86 7.37 5.36 5.02 4.29 4.16
2002 4.23 4.14 4.14 4.15 4.79 6.19 9.13 8.46 5.98 5.2 4.27 4.47
2003 4.43 4.19 4.28 4.61 5.41 5.67 6.26 6.45 6.01 5.26 4.01 4.13
2004 4.27 4.06 4.04 4.23 4.8 5.26 5.98 5.98 5.86 5.55 4.39 4.3
2005 4 3.55 3.66 4.07 5.58 7.15 9.47 8.72 5.87 4.96 4.22 4.17
2006 3.93 3.77 3.68 4.01 4.96 5.08 6.54 6.76 4.76 4.41 4.09
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Table E-3: Historical record of average water consumption per household (by 1000 gallons): Hoffman
Estates
year/month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2001 4.8 4.17 4.54 4.59 5.29 5.59 7.68 6.56 5.58 5.18 4.5 4.59
2002 4.41 4.46 3.9 4.16 4.84 5.61 7.44 6.95 5.01 4.55 4.29 4.34
2003 4.51 4.59 4.05 4.14 4.47 5.34 6.21 5.73 5.29 4.76 4.12 4.52
2004 4.43 3.98 3.87 4.59 4.64 4.88 5.88 5.54 5.76 4.82 3.88 4.53
2005 4.25 4 4.08 4.26 4.66 6.64 8.45 7.08 6.43 4.52 4.15 4.29
2006 4.06 3.79 4.04 4.14 4.65 5.28 5.31 5.23 5 4.07 3.96 4.14
Table E-4: Historical record of average water consumption per household (by 1000 gallons): Liber-
tyville
water
year/month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2002 6.05 7.73 8.69 9.21 8.38 6.28 5.65 5.71
2003 6.33 6.39 5.91 5.79 5.76 6.67 7.28 7.93 7.93 6.27 5.65 5.98
2004 5.95 5.54 5.27 5.3 5.54 6.05 6.82 7.91 8.14 7.22 6.01 5.46
2005 5.82 5.7 5.3 5.27 5.89 8.24 9.72 9.99 9.28 7.12 5.97 5.83
2006 5.89 5.56 5.37 5.5 5.87 6.98 7.92 8.08 7.08 5.56 5.5 5.79
2007 5.61 5.35 5 5.1 5.95 7.48 8.14 7.63 6.79 6.41 6.06 5.4
Table E-5: Historical record of average water consumption per household (by 1000 gallons):
Naperville
year/month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1999 6.53 4.84 5.5 6.13 6.24 7.64 10.16 10.26 8.98 6.81 5.56 5.4
2000 5.96 5.37 5.04 5.15 6.09 6.8 8.05 9.37 10.03 6.1 5.3 5.75
2001 5.23 5.18 4.69 5.64 6.63 7.19 12.44 11.44 7.23 6.63 4.67 5.02
2002 5.3 5.32 4.85 4.39 5.36 7.33 11.77 10.42 9.41 7.36 4.82 5.62
2003 4.83 5.31 4.94 5.33 6.13 7.64 9.66 8.21 9.72 6.76 5.53 5.05
2004 5.15 5.31 5.43 4.63 6.08 6.94 8.41 8.73 8.39 8.02 4.6 4.88
2005 5.89 4.94 4.6 4.34 6.06 8.72 14.74 12.52 11.02 8.24 5.21 5.49
2006 5.25 3.94 4.89 4.6 5.31 8.54 9.06 8.85 7.58 5.14 4.01 5.1
2007 4.82 5.13 4.97 4.32 5.4 9.3 11.57 8.99 8.05 8.22 4.91 4.04
Table E-6: Historical record of average water consumption per household (by 1000 gallons): Orland
Park
year/month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1995 5.8 5.45 4.95 5.79 5.88 8.51 12.12 11.99 11.49 9.59 6.65 6.06
1996 5.57 5.24 5.61 5.6 6.16 6.96 10.4 12.55 12.53 7.98 6.1 5.72
1997 6.26 5.58 5.2 4.89 6.61 7.79 11.63 10.22 9.92 7.19 6.72 5.78
1998 5.85 5.18 5.25 5.35 7.88 8.37 12.22 11.2 11.1 7.59 6.65 5.02
1999 6.09 5.45 5.4 5.39 6.41 6.79 12.27 11.32 13.08 8.64 6.47 5.64
2000 6.22 4.69 6.02 5.26 6.34 6.58 9.72 8.43 11.59 8.3 6.73 5.46
2001 5.72 5.19 5.55 4.67 6.97 7.57 11.86 10.19 9.98 5.11 6.75 5.18
2002 5.53 4.74 5.92 4.81 5.67 7.28 13.25 11.08 14.24 7.45 6.45 5.04
2003 6.05 5.01 5.61 4.85 7.04 6.86 10.24 8.63 9.13 5.89 6.26 4.83
2004 5.88 4.99 5.26 5.03 6.44 5.87 9.78 8.94 9.69 7.26 6.15 4.37
2005 5.64 4.99 5.05 4.8 6.88 8.66 12.42 11.35 12.26 8.74 6.72 4.43
2006 5.29 4.85 4.91 4.67 6.7 7.23 10.67 9.24 8.32 5.15 5.33 4.16
2007 5.15 4.77 4.96 4.29 6.8 8.56 11.2 7.81 8.44
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Table E-7: Historical record of average water consumption per household (by 1000 gallons): Plain
Field
year/month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2003 4.13 4.06 5.47 6.83 8.82 6.23 7.38 7.19 5.5 5.03
2004 4.53 4.58 4.2 5.05 5.38 6.2 8.53 7.88 8.18 8.13 5.05 4.88
2005 4.72 4.46 5.49 5.61 7.95 16.3 12.39 11.74 7.61 6.36 5.86 5.85
2006 5 4.77 5.88 5.2 8.94 10.68 9.19 10.27 6.34 5.32 5.76
Table E-8: Historical record of average water consumption per household (by 1000 gallons): Roselle
year/month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1997 3.71 3.33 3.72 3.89 4.39 4.83 5.55 4.8 4.62 4.7 4.89 5.04
1998 4.93 4.4 4.98 5.05 6.71 6.21 6.85 5.87 5.45 5.31 5.17 5.58
1999 5.57 4.82 5.33 5.17 5.87 6.06 6.93 6.33 6.42 5.45 5.3 5.64
2000 5.57 5 5.33 5.34 5.78 5.88 6.45 6.42 5.72 5.34 5.33 5.69
2001 5.37 4.79 5.3 5.2 5.69 6.69 7.38 6.32 5.19 5.3 5.03 5.32
2002 5.47 4.78 5.23 5.02 5.57 6.4 7.4 6.07 5.56 5.11 5.01 5.36
2003 5.31 4.68 5.16 5.07 5.59 6.25 6.01 6.02 5.51 5.18 4.95 5.25
2004 6.39 4.03 4.83 5.01 5.28 5.85 6.49 5.86 5.58 5.07 4.97 5.21
2005 5.35 4.47 4.71 4.8 5.8 7.26 7.68 6.59 5.57 5.06 4.64 5.11
2006 4.74 4.2 5.16 4.81 5.32 5.89 5.81 5.39 4.66 4.62 4.6 5.71
2007 3.78 4.24 4.66 4.69 5.3 5.77 5.9 5.1 4.71 4.85 5.2 4.62
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Historical record of water and sewer prices
Table E-9: Historical water and sewer prices 1 ($)
Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Jan-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Feb-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Mar-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Apr-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
May-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jun-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jul-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Aug-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Sep-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Oct-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Nov-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Dec-95 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jan-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Feb-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Mar-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Apr-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
May-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jun-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jul-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Aug-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Sep-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Oct-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Nov-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Dec-96 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jan-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Feb-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
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Table E-9 – Continued
Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Mar-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Apr-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
May-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jun-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jul-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Aug-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Sep-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Oct-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Nov-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Dec-97 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jan-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Feb-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Mar-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Apr-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
May-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jun-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jul-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Aug-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Sep-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Oct-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Nov-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Dec-98 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jan-99 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Feb-99 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Mar-99 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Apr-99 3.35 2.55 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
May-99 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Jun-99 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
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Table E-9 – Continued
Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Jul-99 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Aug-99 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Sep-99 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Oct-99 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Nov-99 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.40 0.60 NA 2.40
Dec-99 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Jan-00 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Feb-00 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Mar-00 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Apr-00 3.42 2.69 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
May-00 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Jun-00 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Jul-00 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Aug-00 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Sep-00 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Oct-00 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Nov-00 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.73 0.69 NA 2.40
Dec-00 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
Jan-01 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
Feb-01 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
Mar-01 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
Apr-01 3.46 2.87 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
May-01 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
Jun-01 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
Jul-01 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
Aug-01 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
Sep-01 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
Oct-01 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
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Table E-9 – Continued
Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Nov-01 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.80 0.71 NA 2.40
Dec-01 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 NA 2.40
Jan-02 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 NA 2.40
Feb-02 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 NA 2.40
Mar-02 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 NA 2.40
Apr-02 3.49 3.07 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 NA 2.40
May-02 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 NA 2.40
Jun-02 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 NA 2.40
Jul-02 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 3.69>4k 2.40
Aug-02 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 3.69>4k 2.40
Sep-02 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 3.69>4k 2.40
Oct-02 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 3.69>4k 2.40
Nov-02 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.87 0.73 3.69>4k 2.40
Dec-02 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 3.69>4k 2.40
Jan-03 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 3.88>4k 2.40
Feb-03 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 3.88>4k 2.40
Mar-03 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 3.88>4k 2.40
Apr-03 3.54 3.26 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 3.88>4k 2.40
May-03 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 3.88>4k 2.40
Jun-03 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 3.88>4k 2.40
Jul-03 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 4.18>4k 2.40
Aug-03 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 4.18>4k 2.40
Sep-03 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 4.18>4k 2.40
Oct-03 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 4.18>4k 2.40
Nov-03 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 2.94 0.75 4.18>4k 2.40
Dec-03 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.40
Jan-04 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.40
Feb-04 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.40
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Table E-9 – Continued
Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Mar-04 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.40
Apr-04 3.58 3.47 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.40
May-04 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.40
Jun-04 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.40
Jul-04 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.50
Aug-04 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.50
Sep-04 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.50
Oct-04 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.50
Nov-04 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.01 0.77 4.18>4k 2.50
Dec-04 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Jan-05 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Feb-05 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Mar-05 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Apr-05 3.58 3.59 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
May-05 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Jun-05 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Jul-05 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Aug-05 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Sep-05 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Oct-05 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Nov-05 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.20 0.80 4.18>4k 2.50
Dec-05 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.18>4k 2.50
Jan-06 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.18>4k 2.50
Feb-06 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.18>4k 2.50
Mar-06 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.18>4k 2.50
Apr-06 3.71 3.72 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.18>4k 2.50
May-06 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.18>4k 2.50
Jun-06 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.40>4k 2.50
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Table E-9 – Continued
Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Jul-06 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.40>4k 2.50
Aug-06 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.40>4k 2.50
Sep-06 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.40>4k 2.50
Oct-06 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.40>4k 2.50
Nov-06 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.40 0.83 4.40>4k 2.50
Dec-06 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Jan-07 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Feb-07 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Mar-07 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Apr-07 3.63 3.85 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
May-07 3.78 3.92 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Jun-07 3.78 3.92 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Jul-07 3.78 3.92 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Aug-07 3.78 3.92 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Sep-07 3.78 3.92 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Oct-07 3.78 3.92 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Nov-07 3.78 3.92 1.57 0.23 3.62 0.86 4.40>4k 2.50
Dec-07 3.78 3.92 1.57 0.23 3.86 0.89 4.40>4k 2.50
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Table E-10: Historical water and sewer prices 2 ($)
Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Jan-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Feb-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Mar-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Apr-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
May-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Jun-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Jul-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Aug-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Sep-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Oct-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Nov-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Dec-95 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.49 2.55
Jan-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
Feb-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
Mar-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
Apr-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
May-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
Jun-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
Jul-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
Aug-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
Sep-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
Oct-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
Nov-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.40 2.64
Dec-96 2.94 1.51 2.15 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Jan-97 2.94 1.51 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Feb-97 2.94 1.51 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Mar-97 2.94 1.51 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
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Table E-10 – Continued
Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Apr-97 2.94 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
May-97 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Jun-97 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Jul-97 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Aug-97 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Sep-97 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Oct-97 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Nov-97 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Dec-97 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.78
Jan-98 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Feb-98 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Mar-98 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Apr-98 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
May-98 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Jun-98 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Jul-98 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Aug-98 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Sep-98 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Oct-98 2.70 1.47 2.20 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Nov-98 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Dec-98 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.26 2.64
Jan-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
Feb-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
Mar-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
Apr-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
May-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
Jun-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
Jul-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
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Table E-10 – Continued
Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Aug-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
Sep-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
Oct-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
Nov-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
Dec-99 2.70 1.47 2.24 0.35 NA NA 3.12 2.58
Jan-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 NA NA 2.92 2.78
Feb-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 NA NA 2.92 2.78
Mar-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 NA NA 2.92 2.78
Apr-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 NA NA 2.92 2.78
May-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 NA NA 2.92 2.78
Jun-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 NA NA 2.92 2.78
Jul-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 NA NA 2.92 2.78
Aug-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 NA NA 2.92 2.78
Sep-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 NA NA 2.92 2.78
Oct-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 NA NA 2.92 2.78
Nov-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Dec-00 2.70 1.47 2.33 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Jan-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Feb-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Mar-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Apr-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
May-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Jun-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Jul-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Aug-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Sep-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Oct-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Nov-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.35 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
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Table E-10 – Continued
Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Dec-01 2.70 1.47 2.41 0.36 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Jan-02 2.70 1.47 2.45 (2.87>16k) 0.36 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Feb-02 2.70 1.47 2.45 (2.87>16k) 0.36 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Mar-02 2.70 1.47 2.45 (2.87>16k) 0.36 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Apr-02 2.70 1.47 2.45 (2.87>16k) 0.36 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
May-02 2.70 1.47 2.45 (2.87>16k) 0.36 2.63 1.96 2.92 2.78
Jun-02 2.70 1.47 2.45 (2.87>16k) 0.36 2.63 1.96 3.10 2.95
Jul-02 2.70 1.47 2.45 (2.87>16k) 0.36 2.63 1.96 3.10 2.95
Aug-02 2.70 1.47 2.45 (2.87>16k) 0.36 2.63 1.96 3.10 2.95
Sep-02 2.70 1.47 2.45 (2.87>16k) 0.36 2.63 1.96 3.10 2.95
Oct-02 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 2.63 1.96 3.10 2.95
Nov-02 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 2.63 2.72 3.10 2.95
Dec-02 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 3.64 2.72 3.10 2.95
Jan-03 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 3.64 2.72 3.10 3.05
Feb-03 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 3.64 2.72 3.10 3.05
Mar-03 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 3.64 2.72 3.10 3.05
Apr-03 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 3.64 2.80 3.10 3.05
May-03 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 3.64 2.80 3.10 3.05
Jun-03 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 3.64 2.80 3.10 3.05
Jul-03 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 3.64 2.80 3.10 3.05
Aug-03 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 3.64 2.80 3.10 3.05
Sep-03 2.70 1.47 2.51 (2.94>16k) 0.39 3.64 2.80 3.10 3.05
Oct-03 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.64 2.80 3.10 3.05
Nov-03 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.64 2.80 3.10 3.05
Dec-03 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.74 2.80 3.10 3.05
Jan-04 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.74 2.80 3.10 3.05
Feb-04 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.74 2.80 3.10 3.05
Mar-04 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.74 2.80 3.10 3.05
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Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Apr-04 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.74 3.98 3.10 3.05
May-04 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.74 3.98 3.10 3.05
Jun-04 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.74 3.98 3.10 3.05
Jul-04 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.74 3.98 3.20 3.05
Aug-04 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.74 3.98 3.20 3.05
Sep-04 2.70 1.47 2.57 (3.02>16k) 0.41 3.74 3.98 3.20 3.05
Oct-04 2.70 1.47 2.61 (3.09>16k) 0.41 3.74 3.98 3.20 3.05
Nov-04 2.70 1.47 2.61 (3.09>16k) 0.41 3.74 3.98 3.20 3.05
Dec-04 2.70 1.47 2.61 (3.09>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Jan-05 2.70 1.47 2.61 (3.09>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Feb-05 2.70 1.47 2.61 (3.09>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Mar-05 2.70 1.47 2.61 (3.09>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Apr-05 2.70 1.47 2.74 (3.25>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
May-05 2.70 1.47 2.74 (3.25>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Jun-05 2.70 1.47 2.74 (3.25>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Jul-05 2.70 1.47 2.74 (3.25>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Aug-05 2.70 1.47 2.74 (3.25>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Sep-05 2.70 1.47 2.74 (3.25>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Oct-05 2.70 1.47 3.02 (3.58>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Nov-05 2.70 1.47 3.02 (3.58>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Dec-05 2.70 1.47 3.02 (3.58>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.05
Jan-06 2.70 1.47 3.02 (3.58>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
Feb-06 2.70 1.47 3.02 (3.58>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
Mar-06 2.70 1.47 3.02 (3.58>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
Apr-06 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
May-06 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
Jun-06 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
Jul-06 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
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Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer Water Sewer
Aug-06 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
Sep-06 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
Oct-06 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
Nov-06 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
Dec-06 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 3.80
Jan-07 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
Feb-07 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
Mar-07 2.51 1.47 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
Apr-07 2.51 1.49 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
May-07 2.51 1.49 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
Jun-07 2.51 1.49 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
Jul-07 2.51 1.49 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
Aug-07 2.51 1.49 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
Sep-07 2.51 1.49 3.03 (3.59>16k) 0.41 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
Oct-07 2.51 1.49 3.03 1 0.49 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
Nov-07 2.51 1.49 3.03 0.49 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
Dec-07 2.51 1.49 3.03 0.49 5.32 3.98 3.20 4.17
1 Orland Park started to use three-block increasing rate from October 2007.
$3.03 (< 10k), $3.79 (10k < 18k), and $4.55 (> 18k)
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Precipitation
Table E-11: Historical precipitation 1 (inch)
Month-year Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Jan-95 0.98 2.09 3.02 2.33
Feb-95 0.41 0.33 0.27 0.31
Mar-95 1.45 1.90 2.03 1.96
Apr-95 6.56 5.65 5.60 5.47
May-95 5.37 4.26 5.06 4.04
Jun-95 2.06 0.88 1.75 0.64
Jul-95 4.56 4.05 4.17 3.94
Aug-95 5.32 5.22 5.82 5.20
Sep-95 1.52 1.77 1.86 1.83
Oct-95 4.80 4.42 5.18 4.34
Nov-95 3.47 3.47 4.00 3.46
Dec-95 1.02 0.92 0.72 0.90
Jan-96 0.60 1.54 1.37 1.75
Feb-96 1.01 0.75 0.88 0.68
Mar-96 0.30 0.80 0.71 0.92
Apr-96 2.73 2.84 2.57 2.88
May-96 9.56 8.85 9.00 8.60
Jun-96 6.66 6.19 5.55 6.02
Jul-96 5.40 4.19 4.36 4.19
Aug-96 1.12 1.78 4.90 1.92
Sep-96 2.20 1.88 2.05 1.85
Oct-96 2.35 2.63 2.16 2.70
Nov-96 0.54 1.09 1.28 1.23
Dec-96 0.87 1.88 1.77 2.10
Jan-97 1.00 1.96 1.18 2.18
Feb-97 3.64 3.74 5.25 3.77
Mar-97 1.41 1.44 1.87 1.48
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Month-year Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Apr-97 1.26 2.38 1.60 2.65
May-97 2.41 3.50 5.18 3.68
Jun-97 3.10 5.75 2.82 6.40
Jul-97 2.70 2.13 2.79 2.01
Aug-97 4.43 3.99 4.23 3.98
Sep-97 1.07 2.11 2.13 2.32
Oct-97 2.17 1.89 2.27 1.83
Nov-97 1.12 1.91 1.53 2.08
Dec-97 0.70 1.51 1.31 1.68
Jan-98 2.33 3.07 3.34 3.24
Feb-98 2.17 1.93 1.60 1.86
Mar-98 2.10 3.13 2.55 3.40
Apr-98 5.04 4.89 5.22 4.81
May-98 3.29 3.22 3.87 3.24
Jun-98 4.66 4.63 5.46 4.64
Jul-98 1.24 1.73 1.57 1.88
Aug-98 6.78 4.20 4.43 3.69
Sep-98 1.93 2.03 3.15 2.11
Oct-98 5.26 5.25 6.07 5.26
Nov-98 1.28 1.57 1.85 1.64
Dec-98 1.05 1.02 1.68 1.01
Jan-99 4.36 3.83 2.92 4.15
Feb-99 1.62 1.16 1.19 1.27
Mar-99 0.21 1.10 0.46 1.32
Apr-99 7.19 6.69 7.70 6.56
May-99 3.58 2.74 3.28 2.67
Jun-99 5.21 5.04 7.75 5.32
Jul-99 4.40 1.60 3.46 1.43
Aug-99 2.85 4.34 2.82 3.52
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Table E-11 – Continued
Month-year Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Sep-99 2.84 3.51 4.86 4.03
Oct-99 0.95 0.91 1.14 0.93
Nov-99 0.39 0.35 0.57 0.41
Dec-99 2.26 1.91 2.27 1.85
Jan-00 0.66 1.46 1.38 1.57
Feb-00 0.29 1.46 1.17 1.70
Mar-00 0.98 1.22 1.33 1.25
Apr-00 0.83 4.53 4.32 4.44
May-00 3.08 5.89 4.87 6.17
Jun-00 4.16 7.34 6.43 7.64
Jul-00 3.21 5.80 4.20 5.32
Aug-00 2.67 2.43 2.93 2.14
Sep-00 2.40 5.30 5.99 5.26
Oct-00 1.65 1.40 1.61 1.46
Nov-00 3.66 3.77 4.31 3.52
Dec-00 0.32 2.39 2.35 2.57
Jan-01 0.81 1.06 1.34 1.10
Feb-01 1.57 2.32 2.58 2.33
Mar-01 1.34 0.92 0.95 1.02
Apr-01 3.09 3.19 3.60 3.37
May-01 3.58 4.49 4.15 4.55
Jun-01 5.28 2.90 3.67 2.70
Jul-01 1.59 2.81 1.77 2.69
Aug-01 6.02 3.96 4.27 4.04
Sep-01 6.53 5.30 6.01 5.00
Oct-01 7.89 7.51 7.45 7.05
Nov-01 1.57 1.31 1.79 1.39
Dec-01 1.21 0.97 1.33 0.97
Jan-02 0.73 0.98 1.38 1.08
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Month-year Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Feb-02 1.55 1.56 1.32 1.62
Mar-02 2.47 2.17 2.03 1.96
Apr-02 4.22 2.74 3.39 3.14
May-02 5.32 3.16 4.32 2.90
Jun-02 5.27 3.84 4.98 3.92
Jul-02 2.24 0.83 1.40 1.06
Aug-02 6.49 6.42 9.95 5.27
Sep-02 0.25 3.49 2.32 3.48
Oct-02 2.75 1.90 1.93 2.24
Nov-02 1.34 0.71 0.98 0.76
Dec-02 2.36 0.84 0.85 0.86
Jan-03 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.41
Feb-03 0.06 0.20 0.37 0.18
Mar-03 1.06 1.64 1.48 1.71
Apr-03 1.45 2.41 2.15 2.51
May-03 6.91 6.99 7.46 6.39
Jun-03 2.28 2.29 1.55 2.33
Jul-03 4.25 5.03 4.88 5.43
Aug-03 5.50 1.28 1.75 1.56
Sep-03 1.78 1.92 2.02 1.83
Oct-03 1.09 1.83 1.92 1.69
Nov-03 5.25 5.12 5.57 4.96
Dec-03 2.29 2.39 2.72 2.49
Jan-04 0.75 0.90 0.76 0.98
Feb-04 0.82 0.87 1.00 0.99
Mar-04 4.32 4.88 5.00 4.61
Apr-04 1.24 1.88 1.71 1.98
May-04 7.79 8.69 8.47 8.83
Jun-04 4.80 4.25 4.22 4.59
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Month-year Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Jul-04 1.62 2.83 2.07 2.63
Aug-04 3.81 2.66 3.87 2.78
Sep-04 0.21 0.51 0.77 0.67
Oct-04 2.95 2.38 2.65 2.38
Nov-04 3.23 3.24 3.19 3.28
Dec-04 1.42 1.67 2.05 1.56
Jan-05 3.68 3.65 3.58 3.59
Feb-05 2.05 1.90 1.76 2.03
Mar-05 1.04 0.85 0.86 0.90
Apr-05 2.13 1.82 2.50 1.75
May-05 1.88 2.91 2.62 2.51
Jun-05 1.14 0.67 0.67 0.64
Jul-05 2.11 2.75 1.55 2.36
Aug-05 3.29 2.88 3.52 3.04
Sep-05 2.30 2.64 2.36 2.62
Oct-05 1.33 0.62 0.75 0.65
Nov-05 2.84 2.96 2.83 2.98
Dec-05 1.29 1.20 1.06 1.28
Jan-06 2.61 2.78 2.83 2.80
Feb-06 1.64 1.19 1.30 1.04
Mar-06 3.21 3.81 3.68 3.78
Apr-06 3.67 2.78 3.24 2.70
May-06 3.93 4.22 4.51 4.04
Jun-06 4.27 3.40 4.30 3.21
Jul-06 5.03 4.10 3.72 3.66
Aug-06 2.70 4.06 3.65 3.52
Sep-06 5.07 3.50 3.93 3.72
Oct-06 4.34 5.34 4.95 5.13
Nov-06 3.05 2.72 2.74 2.67
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Month-year Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Dec-06 2.88 3.09 3.08 3.11
Jan-07 1.81 1.32 1.54 1.39
Feb-07 1.57 2.61 2.08 2.51
Mar-07 3.26 3.68 3.24 3.52
Apr-07 3.72 4.29 4.05 4.26
May-07 1.83 1.60 2.42 1.66
Jun-07 2.37 3.44 3.36 3.86
Jul-07 4.19 3.34 5.73 3.33
Aug-07 11.40 12.29 14.63 12.03
Sep-07 1.78 1.23 1.03 1.46
Oct-07 2.58 2.48 2.96 2.64
Nov-07 0.88 0.84 0.95 0.80
Dec-07 3.25 3.81 3.30 3.81
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Table E-12: Historical precipitation 2 (inch)
Month-year Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Jan-95 3.31 2.75 3.38 2.58
Feb-95 0.35 0.61 0.33 0.57
Mar-95 1.79 1.74 1.77 1.55
Apr-95 5.81 6.04 5.75 5.97
May-95 4.85 5.16 4.98 4.99
Jun-95 2.36 1.70 2.52 1.88
Jul-95 4.42 3.47 3.93 5.28
Aug-95 5.79 4.21 4.79 7.76
Sep-95 2.06 1.28 2.21 1.71
Oct-95 5.30 4.67 5.02 5.63
Nov-95 3.88 3.87 3.91 3.64
Dec-95 0.81 0.64 0.79 0.90
Jan-96 1.34 1.39 1.15 1.69
Feb-96 0.74 0.52 0.79 0.56
Mar-96 0.65 0.84 0.60 0.80
Apr-96 2.56 2.64 2.67 2.50
May-96 6.76 6.89 5.84 8.72
Jun-96 5.72 5.45 5.28 6.21
Jul-96 11.97 7.76 17.09 3.71
Aug-96 2.72 1.43 2.18 2.68
Sep-96 2.83 2.58 3.26 2.04
Oct-96 2.09 2.33 2.24 1.93
Nov-96 2.05 1.60 2.28 1.53
Dec-96 1.45 1.23 1.53 1.28
Jan-97 1.59 1.60 1.85 1.69
Feb-97 5.50 5.19 5.61 4.62
Mar-97 1.87 2.01 1.81 1.95
Apr-97 2.07 1.68 2.29 1.51
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Month-year Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
May-97 4.49 3.11 4.49 3.90
Jun-97 2.82 3.44 2.48 3.76
Jul-97 1.60 2.92 1.69 2.01
Aug-97 4.57 5.38 4.36 4.61
Sep-97 1.74 1.55 1.70 1.51
Oct-97 2.35 2.34 2.35 2.24
Nov-97 1.52 1.59 1.63 1.56
Dec-97 1.70 1.36 2.05 1.05
Jan-98 3.01 2.80 3.08 2.62
Feb-98 1.65 1.59 1.74 1.64
Mar-98 2.65 3.49 2.99 2.38
Apr-98 5.20 4.40 5.48 4.67
May-98 3.37 3.76 3.17 3.44
Jun-98 4.96 4.51 5.25 4.12
Jul-98 2.50 2.00 3.01 1.76
Aug-98 4.88 6.83 5.25 4.61
Sep-98 3.05 3.13 3.39 1.93
Oct-98 6.22 5.46 5.74 7.02
Nov-98 1.55 1.64 1.53 1.51
Dec-98 1.55 1.39 1.58 1.26
Jan-99 3.35 4.32 3.06 4.33
Feb-99 1.38 1.55 1.27 1.62
Mar-99 0.88 1.36 0.80 1.04
Apr-99 6.75 7.23 6.46 6.77
May-99 3.92 4.48 4.05 3.93
Jun-99 5.57 5.48 5.32 6.03
Jul-99 3.28 3.08 3.69 2.66
Aug-99 2.56 2.78 2.90 2.09
Sep-99 3.99 3.04 4.34 3.36
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Month-year Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Oct-99 1.06 1.02 0.99 1.08
Nov-99 0.56 0.41 0.59 0.49
Dec-99 2.57 2.62 2.77 2.26
Jan-00 0.79 1.22 0.51 1.10
Feb-00 2.09 1.20 2.69 1.03
Mar-00 0.89 1.12 0.94 0.84
Apr-00 4.12 4.27 4.06 3.53
May-00 4.20 4.29 4.29 3.83
Jun-00 6.01 5.39 6.25 5.32
Jul-00 3.34 3.75 3.63 2.91
Aug-00 3.25 2.50 3.34 3.05
Sep-00 4.97 3.86 4.46 5.16
Oct-00 1.59 1.47 1.66 1.52
Nov-00 3.29 3.46 3.03 3.68
Dec-00 1.53 1.88 1.57 1.20
Jan-01 1.34 1.16 1.36 1.22
Feb-01 2.51 2.66 2.67 2.10
Mar-01 0.98 1.31 0.95 1.07
Apr-01 3.24 3.61 3.53 2.78
May-01 3.59 3.70 3.46 3.75
Jun-01 2.60 3.07 2.62 3.09
Jul-01 1.84 2.99 1.22 2.51
Aug-01 4.77 7.28 4.13 5.85
Sep-01 6.94 5.70 6.36 7.71
Oct-01 7.80 8.55 7.15 8.59
Nov-01 1.75 1.53 1.82 1.63
Dec-01 1.15 1.08 1.08 1.26
Jan-02 1.19 1.19 1.26 1.01
Feb-02 1.27 1.12 1.29 1.31
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Month-year Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Mar-02 2.42 2.91 2.51 2.23
Apr-02 3.54 4.09 3.77 3.32
May-02 4.97 4.57 4.97 5.05
Jun-02 4.15 4.60 4.11 4.42
Jul-02 1.60 2.90 1.53 1.74
Aug-02 7.55 6.56 7.82 7.09
Sep-02 2.13 1.53 1.79 2.25
Oct-02 1.91 2.00 2.00 1.94
Nov-02 0.74 1.12 0.65 0.95
Dec-02 0.85 1.92 0.93 0.98
Jan-03 0.41 0.47 0.41 0.38
Feb-03 0.35 0.29 0.36 0.27
Mar-03 1.51 1.57 1.62 1.29
Apr-03 2.49 2.88 2.63 2.13
May-03 8.33 6.53 8.16 8.33
Jun-03 2.14 1.53 2.01 2.12
Jul-03 4.17 5.23 4.65 3.34
Aug-03 3.33 4.18 2.82 3.59
Sep-03 2.22 2.26 2.39 1.88
Oct-03 1.46 1.80 1.58 1.55
Nov-03 6.19 5.38 6.65 5.42
Dec-03 2.65 2.13 2.83 2.38
Jan-04 0.76 0.92 0.77 0.73
Feb-04 0.90 0.74 0.94 0.83
Mar-04 4.68 3.84 4.69 4.62
Apr-04 1.43 1.05 1.48 1.33
May-04 8.28 6.36 8.67 7.82
Jun-04 4.95 4.02 4.79 5.14
Jul-04 1.54 2.77 1.53 1.49
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Month-year Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Aug-04 3.61 4.82 3.62 3.57
Sep-04 0.37 0.33 0.47 0.21
Oct-04 2.97 2.69 3.00 2.95
Nov-04 3.32 4.08 3.46 3.07
Dec-04 1.55 1.59 1.56 1.48
Jan-05 3.77 4.32 3.81 3.66
Feb-05 2.17 2.20 2.25 2.03
Mar-05 1.01 1.36 1.03 0.97
Apr-05 2.19 1.98 2.15 2.24
May-05 2.18 1.95 2.39 1.86
Jun-05 1.11 1.19 1.02 1.21
Jul-05 2.30 2.58 2.34 2.17
Aug-05 3.50 2.54 3.58 3.41
Sep-05 1.99 2.32 1.84 2.23
Oct-05 1.04 1.14 0.88 1.31
Nov-05 2.78 2.55 2.69 2.93
Dec-05 1.30 1.48 1.30 1.28
Jan-06 2.96 2.91 3.19 2.59
Feb-06 1.39 1.65 1.25 1.61
Mar-06 3.18 2.72 3.13 3.28
Apr-06 3.65 3.65 3.63 3.68
May-06 4.77 4.50 4.51 4.02
Jun-06 4.53 5.00 4.57 4.36
Jul-06 3.69 3.22 2.78 5.18
Aug-06 2.79 3.30 2.83 2.68
Sep-06 5.44 5.55 5.77 4.94
Oct-06 4.78 5.35 4.90 4.46
Nov-06 2.93 3.64 2.89 2.96
Dec-06 2.98 3.13 3.08 2.83
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Month-year Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Jan-07 1.82 2.05 1.78 1.84
Feb-07 1.92 1.97 2.12 1.59
Mar-07 3.42 3.28 3.60 3.18
Apr-07 4.15 4.17 4.35 3.79
May-07 1.67 1.70 1.57 1.83
Jun-07 2.63 2.54 2.77 2.40
Jul-07 5.72 3.74 6.72 4.22
Aug-07 10.81 9.38 10.35 11.62
Sep-07 1.47 1.22 1.23 1.85
Oct-07 3.40 2.08 3.84 2.73
Nov-07 0.99 1.33 1.07 0.84
Dec-07 3.33 3.43 3.40 3.22
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Temperature
Table E-13: Historical temperature 1 (◦F )
Month-year Addison Buffalo Grove Hoffman Estates Libertyville
Jan-95 22.45 22.14 21.12 22.13
Feb-95 24.87 23.96 23.73 23.78
Mar-95 38.57 37.83 37.67 37.77
Apr-95 44.12 43.16 43.51 43.13
May-95 57.58 56.61 56.82 56.60
Jun-95 71.97 70.45 70.80 70.28
Jul-95 76.46 75.10 75.07 74.97
Aug-95 78.68 76.89 77.50 76.57
Sep-95 61.20 60.74 60.18 60.74
Oct-95 52.40 51.93 51.88 51.81
Nov-95 31.33 30.86 30.50 30.84
Dec-95 24.51 23.81 23.73 23.72
Jan-96 21.52 20.46 20.38 20.25
Feb-96 23.74 23.44 22.78 23.52
Mar-96 29.41 29.01 28.72 29.08
Apr-96 43.82 43.32 43.57 43.38
May-96 54.43 53.55 53.88 53.48
Jun-96 68.33 66.92 67.56 66.86
Jul-96 69.49 68.95 69.20 68.85
Aug-96 71.89 71.44 71.23 71.43
Sep-96 62.52 62.85 62.03 63.00
Oct-96 51.41 51.10 50.80 51.03
Nov-96 31.20 31.30 30.63 31.45
Dec-96 25.91 25.94 25.17 25.92
Jan-97 17.45 17.38 16.40 17.50
Feb-97 27.29 27.29 26.34 27.34
Mar-97 36.68 35.94 36.44 35.82
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Apr-97 44.22 44.08 44.11 44.19
May-97 52.58 52.14 52.64 52.14
Jun-97 68.30 67.37 68.06 67.36
Jul-97 72.79 71.70 72.61 71.53
Aug-97 68.28 67.68 68.13 67.64
Sep-97 62.90 62.71 62.98 62.70
Oct-97 51.49 52.11 51.48 52.31
Nov-97 35.01 35.19 35.04 35.13
Dec-97 29.87 30.12 29.76 30.11
Jan-98 27.32 27.42 27.02 27.49
Feb-98 37.15 36.62 37.05 36.62
Mar-98 36.88 36.97 36.82 37.11
Apr-98 48.50 48.37 48.53 48.44
May-98 63.82 63.09 63.75 63.10
Jun-98 68.65 67.90 68.61 67.81
Jul-98 73.28 72.66 73.14 72.64
Aug-98 73.09 72.98 73.17 72.98
Sep-98 66.48 67.10 66.82 67.24
Oct-98 52.89 53.44 53.08 53.64
Nov-98 42.35 42.82 42.25 42.99
Dec-98 32.99 32.91 33.11 32.91
Jan-99 19.34 19.11 18.63 19.19
Feb-99 32.04 32.64 32.28 32.80
Mar-99 34.05 34.60 34.11 34.81
Apr-99 48.46 48.47 49.01 48.55
May-99 60.81 60.49 60.92 60.56
Jun-99 69.67 69.02 69.94 68.96
Jul-99 77.34 77.28 77.35 77.30
Aug-99 69.00 69.36 68.91 69.49
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Sep-99 61.69 62.41 61.86 62.73
Oct-99 50.29 50.91 50.25 51.12
Nov-99 43.23 44.45 43.95 44.73
Dec-99 27.13 28.17 27.32 28.53
Jan-00 22.93 23.30 22.65 23.36
Feb-00 30.51 31.87 30.98 32.26
Mar-00 42.00 43.14 43.22 43.17
Apr-00 45.57 46.44 47.13 46.53
May-00 60.04 60.57 61.11 60.43
Jun-00 65.83 66.96 66.55 66.84
Jul-00 69.47 70.15 71.18 70.00
Aug-00 70.53 70.96 71.10 71.14
Sep-00 62.91 63.55 63.34 63.43
Oct-00 54.55 55.42 55.01 55.33
Nov-00 35.78 37.07 36.52 36.93
Dec-00 14.29 15.12 14.45 15.21
Jan-01 22.81 23.50 22.62 23.77
Feb-01 23.41 24.09 24.14 24.04
Mar-01 31.92 32.53 32.93 32.74
Apr-01 51.03 51.33 51.85 51.36
May-01 59.51 60.24 60.40 59.89
Jun-01 66.10 67.00 66.53 67.02
Jul-01 73.54 73.84 74.34 73.84
Aug-01 72.14 73.20 72.87 73.03
Sep-01 60.11 61.09 60.93 61.10
Oct-01 50.47 51.31 50.88 51.31
Nov-01 45.92 47.79 47.33 47.92
Dec-01 31.12 33.07 32.41 33.01
Jan-02 28.80 30.10 29.48 30.31
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Feb-02 29.67 31.15 30.22 31.30
Mar-02 33.38 32.57 32.69 32.52
Apr-02 48.84 48.29 48.38 48.22
May-02 54.39 53.00 53.77 53.16
Jun-02 70.76 69.76 70.07 69.65
Jul-02 77.10 76.59 76.07 76.34
Aug-02 73.20 72.84 72.46 72.80
Sep-02 66.91 66.59 65.97 66.68
Oct-02 49.80 49.08 49.78 48.72
Nov-02 36.21 37.06 36.72 37.15
Dec-02 28.49 28.89 28.58 29.10
Jan-03 19.59 19.35 18.61 19.62
Feb-03 22.54 21.80 21.57 21.96
Mar-03 36.29 35.38 35.12 35.26
Apr-03 47.49 45.94 47.37 45.88
May-03 56.71 54.90 56.56 54.89
Jun-03 65.91 64.88 66.02 65.00
Jul-03 71.91 71.73 72.53 71.58
Aug-03 73.85 73.27 74.41 73.05
Sep-03 63.16 63.06 63.47 62.87
Oct-03 50.74 51.00 50.86 51.11
Nov-03 40.51 40.56 40.64 40.53
Dec-03 30.30 30.99 30.14 30.93
Jan-04 18.83 18.43 18.18 18.43
Feb-04 26.18 26.10 25.54 26.54
Mar-04 40.30 40.51 39.89 40.20
Apr-04 49.67 49.23 50.01 49.28
May-04 59.76 57.74 58.59 57.88
Jun-04 66.94 65.77 66.01 65.80
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Jul-04 71.36 69.89 70.33 69.99
Aug-04 67.17 66.19 66.03 66.47
Sep-04 66.50 66.51 65.86 66.55
Oct-04 52.43 52.36 51.81 52.57
Nov-04 42.31 41.99 41.51 42.05
Dec-04 26.37 26.35 25.69 26.81
Jan-05 24.17 22.54 23.28 22.51
Feb-05 31.28 30.85 30.72 30.87
Mar-05 32.98 32.72 33.03 33.09
Apr-05 51.52 50.07 51.56 50.22
May-05 56.45 55.55 56.16 55.74
Jun-05 74.28 72.69 73.48 72.89
Jul-05 75.27 73.67 74.60 73.90
Aug-05 74.06 73.00 73.12 73.13
Sep-05 69.40 68.54 68.27 68.59
Oct-05 53.73 53.63 52.90 53.99
Nov-05 40.37 40.25 39.74 40.42
Dec-05 22.18 21.71 20.96 22.05
Jan-06 34.17 33.20 33.29 33.23
Feb-06 26.65 25.57 25.69 25.57
Mar-06 36.91 35.74 36.09 35.81
Apr-06 52.61 51.23 52.04 51.38
May-06 58.74 58.42 58.51 58.53
Jun-06 67.97 66.42 67.00 66.51
Jul-06 76.09 74.55 74.66 74.81
Aug-06 73.32 72.23 72.19 72.62
Sep-06 61.34 60.99 60.78 61.19
Oct-06 47.75 47.19 47.07 47.32
Nov-06 42.33 42.10 41.48 42.16
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Dec-06 32.33 31.31 30.39 31.43
Jan-07 27.33 27.40 25.75 26.62
Feb-07 16.69 16.58 14.44 15.48
Mar-07 41.77 41.79 40.26 39.70
Apr-07 46.47 46.40 45.34 45.13
May-07 63.64 63.57 62.38 61.69
Jun-07 71.32 71.21 69.61 69.41
Jul-07 73.21 73.00 71.21 71.59
Aug-07 74.47 74.38 72.91 73.12
Sep-07 66.30 65.97 65.48 66.17
Oct-07 57.61 57.42 57.10 57.68
Nov-07 37.60 37.35 37.55 38.08
Dec-07 25.53 25.20 24.33 24.91
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Table E-14: Historical temperature 2 (◦F )
Month-year Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Jan-95 21.45 23.87 21.17 22.23
Feb-95 23.87 26.97 23.64 24.67
Mar-95 38.24 40.41 38.33 38.36
Apr-95 45.86 46.42 46.79 43.89
May-95 58.19 58.95 58.65 57.42
Jun-95 71.59 72.28 71.66 71.93
Jul-95 75.80 77.37 75.72 76.29
Aug-95 77.30 79.38 76.86 78.65
Sep-95 60.99 62.64 61.11 61.02
Oct-95 52.19 54.41 52.18 52.26
Nov-95 32.04 32.69 32.41 31.12
Dec-95 24.54 26.25 24.65 24.25
Jan-96 21.47 23.60 21.55 21.28
Feb-96 24.19 26.60 24.64 23.44
Mar-96 30.07 31.50 30.50 29.26
Apr-96 44.59 46.07 45.06 43.68
May-96 54.84 55.86 55.18 54.40
Jun-96 69.05 69.08 69.51 68.44
Jul-96 70.15 70.35 70.44 69.46
Aug-96 72.35 72.70 72.59 71.86
Sep-96 63.06 63.88 63.33 62.41
Oct-96 51.40 52.91 51.52 51.41
Nov-96 31.44 33.01 31.64 30.87
Dec-96 25.92 27.74 25.97 25.66
Jan-97 17.47 19.72 17.61 17.10
Feb-97 27.23 29.45 27.39 27.08
Mar-97 37.01 39.07 37.23 36.58
Apr-97 44.53 45.67 44.75 44.11
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May-97 53.03 54.53 53.27 52.45
Jun-97 68.83 69.49 69.12 68.38
Jul-97 73.03 74.22 73.08 72.80
Aug-97 68.67 70.14 68.85 68.15
Sep-97 63.66 64.87 63.97 62.76
Oct-97 52.23 53.65 52.61 51.28
Nov-97 35.33 36.70 35.43 34.84
Dec-97 29.84 31.44 29.76 29.64
Jan-98 27.58 29.46 27.72 26.99
Feb-98 37.88 39.05 38.17 36.96
Mar-98 37.50 39.06 37.86 36.59
Apr-98 48.90 50.25 49.15 48.34
May-98 64.18 65.58 64.43 63.73
Jun-98 68.87 69.70 68.95 68.58
Jul-98 73.53 74.61 73.58 73.11
Aug-98 73.28 74.30 73.25 73.09
Sep-98 67.40 68.56 67.73 66.36
Oct-98 53.44 55.25 53.75 52.51
Nov-98 42.49 44.62 42.62 42.00
Dec-98 32.92 34.85 32.87 32.76
Jan-99 19.53 22.26 19.74 18.86
Feb-99 32.56 34.54 32.81 31.80
Mar-99 34.69 36.13 34.95 33.87
Apr-99 49.53 50.48 50.00 48.35
May-99 61.47 62.76 61.81 60.74
Jun-99 70.11 71.00 70.34 69.60
Jul-99 77.42 78.81 77.44 77.22
Aug-99 68.81 71.01 68.76 68.86
Sep-99 61.68 63.90 61.68 61.48
Continued on Next Page. . .
92
Table E-14 – Continued
Month-year Naperville Orland Park Plain Field Roselle
Oct-99 50.62 53.35 50.88 49.96
Nov-99 43.84 46.01 44.09 43.02
Dec-99 27.59 30.14 27.85 26.76
Jan-00 22.81 25.54 22.77 22.62
Feb-00 31.31 34.18 31.74 30.02
Mar-00 42.91 45.00 43.34 41.74
Apr-00 46.93 48.33 47.50 45.41
May-00 61.08 62.58 61.58 59.81
Jun-00 66.42 68.20 66.69 65.68
Jul-00 70.50 71.57 70.88 69.27
Aug-00 71.30 73.22 71.67 70.32
Sep-00 63.69 65.49 63.99 62.71
Oct-00 54.80 56.98 54.92 54.39
Nov-00 36.04 37.73 36.04 35.65
Dec-00 14.23 16.89 14.13 14.11
Jan-01 22.22 25.04 21.91 22.58
Feb-01 24.31 26.98 24.58 23.09
Mar-01 32.79 34.76 33.23 31.63
Apr-01 52.21 53.53 52.71 50.89
May-01 60.25 61.45 60.58 59.53
Jun-01 67.00 68.29 67.43 65.97
Jul-01 74.61 75.45 74.92 73.45
Aug-01 73.44 74.00 73.86 72.04
Sep-01 62.06 62.91 62.85 59.92
Oct-01 51.75 53.01 52.22 50.30
Nov-01 47.70 48.50 48.45 45.62
Dec-01 32.81 33.87 33.46 30.83
Jan-02 30.63 32.08 31.37 28.38
Feb-02 31.30 32.84 31.93 29.36
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Mar-02 34.26 35.33 34.49 33.25
Apr-02 49.90 50.84 50.38 48.75
May-02 55.58 56.14 56.14 54.33
Jun-02 72.13 71.79 72.73 70.77
Jul-02 77.73 77.72 78.00 77.14
Aug-02 74.01 73.86 74.26 73.24
Sep-02 68.48 67.74 69.18 66.86
Oct-02 50.66 50.15 50.93 49.82
Nov-02 37.66 37.94 38.19 36.04
Dec-02 28.79 30.04 28.95 28.24
Jan-03 20.43 21.27 20.81 19.35
Feb-03 23.64 23.92 24.09 22.41
Mar-03 37.50 37.37 37.98 36.28
Apr-03 50.02 49.24 51.03 47.43
May-03 58.30 57.13 58.91 56.82
Jun-03 67.20 65.93 67.68 65.99
Jul-03 72.60 72.26 72.84 71.83
Aug-03 74.48 73.69 74.61 73.88
Sep-03 63.67 63.48 63.78 63.13
Oct-03 51.70 51.95 52.28 50.60
Nov-03 41.03 42.51 41.25 40.36
Dec-03 30.83 31.83 31.05 30.13
Jan-04 19.32 20.63 19.51 18.65
Feb-04 26.90 27.73 27.25 26.03
Mar-04 40.80 41.95 41.12 40.23
Apr-04 50.44 51.18 50.82 49.61
May-04 61.44 61.01 62.25 59.79
Jun-04 67.68 67.55 68.12 66.94
Jul-04 71.69 71.59 71.76 71.41
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Aug-04 67.60 67.79 67.77 67.15
Sep-04 67.14 66.63 67.39 66.51
Oct-04 53.32 54.05 53.78 52.24
Nov-04 42.46 43.56 42.64 42.11
Dec-04 27.17 29.19 27.71 26.04
Jan-05 24.16 24.96 24.13 24.16
Feb-05 31.98 32.87 32.33 31.13
Mar-05 34.41 34.99 35.05 32.68
Apr-05 52.74 52.55 53.21 51.57
May-05 57.43 57.59 57.85 56.39
Jun-05 75.12 74.44 75.41 74.31
Jul-05 75.78 75.58 75.87 75.23
Aug-05 74.48 74.16 74.61 74.01
Sep-05 70.05 69.71 70.30 69.42
Oct-05 54.38 55.26 54.74 53.53
Nov-05 41.12 42.34 41.50 40.16
Dec-05 21.90 23.47 21.80 22.01
Jan-06 34.56 35.92 34.74 33.95
Feb-06 27.07 28.64 27.35 26.46
Mar-06 37.59 38.42 37.95 36.73
Apr-06 53.36 53.53 53.75 52.57
May-06 59.61 59.61 59.98 58.62
Jun-06 68.41 68.32 68.68 67.93
Jul-06 76.38 76.38 76.53 76.03
Aug-06 73.20 73.62 73.24 73.14
Sep-06 61.89 62.45 62.19 61.20
Oct-06 47.95 49.06 48.08 47.70
Nov-06 42.32 43.23 42.33 42.27
Dec-06 32.00 33.91 31.99 32.13
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Jan-07 26.85 28.32 26.73 27.28
Feb-07 16.01 17.70 15.90 16.49
Mar-07 42.33 42.71 42.63 41.68
Apr-07 46.88 46.52 47.14 46.41
May-07 64.11 63.50 64.46 63.60
Jun-07 71.21 70.90 71.24 71.28
Jul-07 72.73 72.81 72.66 73.09
Aug-07 74.34 74.43 74.37 74.41
Sep-07 67.33 66.86 67.91 65.98
Oct-07 58.40 58.37 58.83 57.38
Nov-07 38.22 38.56 38.56 37.30
Dec-07 26.02 26.77 26.33 25.13
96
